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Abstract
Many statistical methods that use low-level election vote count data to detect election
frauds have the limitation that they have a hard time distinguishing distortions in vote
counts that stem from voters’ strategic behavior from distortions that originate with
election frauds. Identifying latent components that underlie election forensics statistics and
other contextual variables can help show the extent to which the statistics measure
fraudulent as opposed to strategic behavior. We use an active-learning procedure with a
support vector machine to classify complaints about German federal elections during
1949–2009 to show the diversity of the complaints, which we use as contextual data. We
also use variables that measure strategic voting in those elections. For the elections of 2005
and 2009 we use latent variable methods to assess whether the parameters of a positive
empirical model of frauds connect through latent variable structure to either the
complaints or the strategic variables. Geographic ambiguity about the locations at which
some complaints occur motivates embedding a geographic mixture structure in the latent
variable model. The “fraud” parameters connect to both complaints and strategic behavior.
1 Introduction
Distinguishing empirical patterns that are caused by election frauds from those that result
from strategic behavior is a core problem for election forensics. Election forensics uses
statistical methods to try to determine whether the results of an election accurately reflect
the intentions of the electors. The statistical methods that have been proposed to assess
election accuracy, or merely to detect frauds (e.g. Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shaikin 2009;
Levin, Cohn, Ordeshook and Alvarez 2009; Mebane 2010; Pericchi and Torres 2011; Cantu
and Saiegh 2011; Deckert, Myagkov and Ordeshook 2011; Beber and Scacco 2012; Klimek,
Yegorov, Hanel and Thurner 2012; Hicken and Mebane 2015; Mebane 2016), all have the
potential to give ambiguous results—while they may be able to tell whether votes have
been shifted, they are hard pressed to tell who moved them (e.g. Mebane 2013, 2014,
2016). Such methods attempt to form conclusions by analyzing exclusively election data
such as vote counts and the number of eligible voters. Context is often invoked as helpful
to evaluate the methods or to enhance conclusions (e.g. Shikano and Mack 2009; Breunig
and Goerres 2011; Cantu and Saiegh 2011; Deckert, Myagkov and Ordeshook 2011),
although only recently has there been an attempt formally to incorporate contextual
information in the statistical analysis (Montgomery, Olivella, Potter and Crisp 2015).
Contextual information may also be ambiguous. In this paper we draw on election
complaints submitted by Germans about German federal elections (Ziblatt 2009; Breunig
and Goerres 2011; Mares and Zhu 2015) to try to assess whether the parameters of a
positive empirical model of frauds (Klimek et al. 2012; Mebane 2016) actually measure
frauds or respond to strategic behavior. Of course the parameters may do both. The
complaints themselves may or may not be motivated by and refer to genuine frauds, by
which we mean maleficent acts that distort the election. Postelection nullification petitions
in Mexico have some similarities to the German complaints, although the Mexican
petitions are submitted by political parties and not directly by citizens. The Mexican
petitions relate in part to election-day problems, but they also clearly relate to parties’
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tactical incentives (Mebane and Wall 2015). We will see that some of the German
complaints address problems with administering the election but others take direct issue
with features of the electoral system. While the former administrative problems may relate
to frauds of kinds that election forensics is directly concerned with, complaints about the
electoral system itself probably do not. All kinds of complaints may relate to citizens’
strategic activites and understandings and not to frauds of any kind.
We use manually coded complaints data from 2005 and 2009 in a latent variable model
to assess how both measures of strategic voting and the distribution of different types of
complaints across districts relate to the distribution of the frauds model parameter
estimates. We use a support vector machine (SVM) in an active learning framework to
classify complaints from elections during 1949–2009 to get a broader perspective on the
diversity of complaints. While we cannot say whether the fraud model’s parameters would
connect to complaints and measures of strategic voting in the same way in the earlier
election periods as they do in 2005 and 2009—and the connections already vary between
those two elections—we expect the relationships are similarly complex in the earlier years.
We use data from the 2005 and 2009 federal elections to help assess the efficacy of a
likelihood implementation (Mebane 2016) of the Klimek et al. (2012) model. While
postelection complaints in Germany do not necessarily concern what might be considered
genuine frauds, they have face validity as imperfect measures of potentially serious
irregularities. Ziblatt (2009) and Mares and Zhu (2015) use such complaints to measure the
occurrence of election frauds in Germany during the years 1871–1912, and Breunig and
Goerres (2011) make a similar usage with regard to more recent elections.
For data from 2005 and 2009 we use a latent variable model to assess how both
measures of strategic voting and the distribution of different types of complaints across
districts relate to the distribution of the fraud probability parameter estimates. The latent
variable model features generalized linear associations between manifest variables and a set
of latent variables that various manifest variables have in common. For some manifest
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variables the relationship to common latent variables is simply linear, while for the binary
variables that measure the incidence of complaints the relationship goes through a probit
model and for the fraud probabilities the relationship goes through a Dirichlet link. Other
fraud model parameters have log-Normal or inverse gamma links.
If fraud-detecting variables are genuinely ambiguous in the sense that they are triggered
both by frauds and by strategic behavior, then common latent variables should connect the
supposed fraud measures to the complaint and strategic variables.
2 Models
The current analysis features a latent variable model that we use with Monte Carlo Markov
Chain (MCMC) Bayesian methods to relate a diverse set of manifest variables to a smaller
set of common latent variables using an exploratory factor analysis model specification.
First we describe the specifications of the latent variable model, which has a number of
nonstandard features: various kinds of nonlinear “links” between manifest and latent
variables; structure to accommodate uncertainty about the geographic locations of some
observations.
Currently the complaints used to produce manifest variables for the latent variable
model come from manually coded complaints from two elections (2005 and 2009), but we
anticipate using codes produced with machine assistance for more years in future iterations
of this analysis. After describing the specifications for the latent variable model, we
describe the specifications and procedures for the active-learning classification framework
we use to classify complaints during 1949–2009.
2.1 Latent Variable model
We use a latent variable model to study whether parameters in a model that estimates the
frequency, type and magnitude of election “frauds” in each district relate more to the
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citizens’ complaints or to measures of strategic voting. These parameter estimates come
from a finite mixture model (Mebane 2016) that implements the positive empirical frauds
conception developed by Klimek et al. (2012). Estimates are based on the plurality rule
votes (Erststimmen) at the polling stations in each single-member district. The parameter
estimates we use for district i = 1, . . . , 299 are: fˆii, the probability of incremental fraud in
district i; fˆ0i, the probability of no fraud in district i; αˆi, the parameter that for district i
determines whether fraud involves more vote manufacturing (from nonvoters) or vote
stealing (from nonleading parties); and θˆi, the parameter that for district i determines the
proportion of votes manufactured from nonvotes and helps determine the number of votes
stolen from nonleading parties (see Mebane (2016) for details).1 If αˆi < 1 then vote
stealing is estimated to be more important, and if αˆi > 1 then manufacturing votes from
nonvoters is more important (Mebane 2016, 8–9).
For the latent variable model there are KC binary manifest variables that measure
complaints, yki, k = 1, . . . , KC , i = 1, . . . , 299. Each of the complaint variables relates to an
unobserved continuous variable xk that is itself related to J common latent variables ξℓ
through equations of the following form,
xki = ck +
J∑
ℓ=1
λkℓξℓi , k = 1, . . . , KC , (1)
where the values of intercept ck and of factor loading λkℓ that are not constant
2 have
Normal distributions and the ξℓ are multivariate Normal with mean γ = (γi, . . . , γJ)
′ and
precision matrix Υ.3 Usually the district associated with a complaint is known with
1We do not use estimates for the probability of extreme fraud, fˆei, because extreme fraud is sparse in the
years for which we estimate the latent variable model: fˆei > 0 only twice in 2009 and never in 2005.
2See the discussion on page 7.
3Adapting specifications given by Lee (2007), the prior for each mean γℓ is Normal, and the prior for Υ
is Wishart. Further details about the prior specifications are in the Model Appendix.
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certainty, in which case the manifest variables yk take the (probit) index variable form
Prob(yki = 0) =
∫
0
−∞
φ(xki, ψk) df (2a)
Prob(yki = 1) =
∫ ∞
0
φ(xki, ψk) df (2b)
where φ(x, ψ) is the Normal density with mean x and precision ψ.4
But sometimes there is uncertainty about the assignment of a complaint to a district
which leads to uncertainty about whether the observation yki should be yki = 0 or yki = 1.
In this case we mix over the two possible values. Let v1 and v2 be the number of registered
voters in the portion of each of the two districts for which the district assignment is
uncertain.5 Generate ri ∈ {0, 1} using probabilities that have Dirichlet priors D([v1, v2]) by
πi ∼ D([v1, v2])
ri ∼ multinom({0, 1}; πi)
With this prior πi has mean
(
v1
v1 + v2
,
v2
v1 + v2
)
. Assuming the probabilities in πi refer to
the events in the order (yki = 1, yki = 0), let
Prob(yki) = ri
∫
0
−∞
φ(xki, ψk) df + (1− ri)
∫ ∞
0
φ(xki, ψk) df . (3)
We generate πi—separately for each pair of districts—because we are uncertain about the
chances that any ambiguously locatable complaint should be associated with one of the two
districts to which it could relate. The components of each πi range over the unit interval
and each ri switches between the values zero and one as the MCMC algorithm proceeds.
The KS manifest variables that relate to strategic behavior connect to the common
latent variables straightforwardly. Denote these manifest variables by xki,
4The precisions ψk have gamma priors.
5Details about how complaints are assigned to districts and about how v1 and v2 are measured are in the
District Association paragraph of the Data Appendix in Mebane and Klaver (2015).
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k = KC + 1, . . . , KC +KS, and define
xki = ck +
J∑
ℓ=1
λkℓξℓi + ǫki , k = KC + 1, . . . , KC +KS , (4)
where ǫki is Normal with mean zero.
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For manifest variables fˆii and fˆ0i = 1− fˆii we use Mi, the number of polling stations in
district i, to specify a Dirichlet likelihood for the probability vector (fˆii, fˆ0i) that depends
on the common latent variables.7 The loglikelihood is
D(fˆii, fˆ0i) = log Γ

 ∑
j∈{0,i}
ζji

− ∑
j∈{0,i}
log Γ(ζji) +
∑
j∈{0,i}
(ζji − 1) log(fˆji) (5a)
ζ0i = Mi
1
1 + exp(xki)
, k = KC +KS + 1 (5b)
ζii = Mi
exp(xki)
1 + exp(xki)
, k = KC +KS + 1 (5c)
xki = ck +
J∑
ℓ=1
λkℓξℓi , k = KC +KS + 1 . (5d)
Evidently xki in (5d) has the same form as xki in (1), also summarizing generalized linear
connections to the common latent variables. If λkℓ, k = KC +KS + 1, for a latent variable
is positive, then an increase in the latent variable tends to go with higher values of fi and
lower values of f0. Including Mi in the likelihood ensures that potentially important
information about varying district sizes—measured by the numbers of polling stations—is
not ignored.
The estimates αˆi and θˆi are also manifest variables when they exist.
8 For αˆi we specify
6The precisions of these variables’ distributions have gamma priors.
7In the algorithm to estimate the finite mixture model that produces fˆii and fˆei, any value of fˆii or fˆei
less than 10−9 is truncated to zero. Therefore for the latent variable model we set 10−9 as the smallest
possible value of fˆii or fˆei. Therefore 2(10
−9) ≤ fˆ0i ≤ 1− 2(10
−9).
8Recall that θ is undefined when fi = 0 and α is undefined when fi = fe = 0.
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a log-normal distribution and for θˆ−1i we use a gamma distribution:
log αˆi ∼ N(xki, ψk) , k = KC +KS + 2 (6a)
θˆ−1i ∼ Γ(xki, ψk) , k = KC +KS + 3 (6b)
xki = ck +
J∑
ℓ=1
λkℓξℓi , k = KC +KS + 2, KC +KS + 3 (6c)
The scales and means of the latent variables are set by matching them to particular
manifest variables, as follows. The factor loadings λkℓ are fixed equal to zero when the
manifest variable is not a measure of latent variable ξℓ. For each latent variable there is one
λkℓ that is fixed equal to 1.0 (using a different k for each ℓ), thus establishing a unit of
measurement (scale) for the latent variables. Each latent variable has λkℓ fixed equal to 1.0
for one distinct value k; and for that value k, λkℓ′ = 0 for all ℓ
′ > ℓ while the λkℓ are free to
take on any value for all other combinations of manifest and latent variables. To set the
mean of each latent variable we fix ck = 0 for the values k that have λkℓ fixed equal to 1.0.
These lower triangular restrictions on λkℓ and zero restrictions on ck are sufficient to
identify the parameters of an “exploratory” factor analysis model (Anderson and Amemiya
1988, 760).
2.2 Active-learning Classification Framework
We classify election complaints according to the type of issue or indicident they address.
While for use in the current paper’s latent variable model we use classifications performed
manually for two recent election periods (Mebane and Klaver 2015), in order to process
complaints from elections spanning 1949 through 2009 we use machine-assisted methods.
In particular we use an active learning approach built on a SVM.
Prior to classification, we first preprocess the text of each document. This involves
stemming, stop word removal, and the eventual transformation of text data into a numeric
matrix. The first of these steps, stemming, reduces words to their base form, removing
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inflections and splitting up compound words. This is particularly important for German,
which is more inflected and compounded than most other languages. Without first
reducing the word space using stemming, the data would be unusually sparse and each
inflection (e.g., “run,” “ran,” and “running”) would count as a separate feature. After
stemming, we remove stop words. Stop words are words we believe have low relative
information value, or words we believe are uninformative to our classification task. Such
words include “and,” “the,” “election,” “complaint,” etc. Finally, once we have
preprocessed the words in each document, we use a “bag of words” model, converting each
document into a document term matrix, where rows represent documents and columns
represent each member word of the dictionary of all words in the corpus. Cell values
represent the count of each word in the document.
Finally, we do one more transformation, called a TF-IDF transformation. TF-IDF
transformations are used to weight word features from text data based on a measure of
importance called “term frequency inverse document frequency.” The idea is that words
that appear very frequently across many documents will be less useful in separating
documents into classes. For M terms and N documents, let f(wk, ti) be the number of
occurrences of term wk in document ti, k = 1, . . . ,M and i = 1, . . . , N . The “term
document” portion of TF-IDF is
di =
∑N
i=1 f(wk, ti)∑M
j=1
∑N
i=1 f(wk, ti)
, (7)
or the proportion of terms in the corpus matching a given term wi. Let zj(wi) = 1 if
document j contains term wi, otherwise zj(wi) = 0. The “inverse document frequency”
measures how often a term occurs across all documents and is measured by
li = log
(
N∑N
j=1 zj(wi)
)
(8)
(Leopold and Kindermann 2002). The TF-IDF weight is si = dili. The end result is a
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vector of TF-IDF weights S (Lan, Tan, Low and Sung 2005).
Our initial classificatory scheme was based on manually coded complaints from 2005
and 2009 (Mebane and Klaver 2015). Because we are expanding our coverage to include
many more recorded election years, we first cluster complaint documents to facilitate
reading a wide range of complaints from various years and of various complaint types.
Along with careful reading of sampled documents from each cluster, we read from a
distance using terms extracted from each cluster by TF-IDF weights. This process helps to
validate and revise our classificatory scheme to better fit elections in all years. Because
clusters match the complaint classes pretty well, we are able to label complaints from each
year and complaint type more easily. We initially labeled 150 complaints for the algorithm,
which was not a large enough training set to achieve our required accuracy.
Because we had very few labeled complaints to start with, we use active learning, an
iterative supervised machine learning technique (Settles 2010). This framework uses
uncertainty sampling to identify observations that we should label by hand to provide the
most useful new input to the next iteration of the classifier. At each iteration, we train a
SVM on labeled complaints.9 We use the distance from the SVM’s separating hyperplane
to measure model uncertainty. We then iteratively label the documents closest to the
hyperplane and refit a model until an acceptable average precision, recall and F-measure
are achieved.
3 Data
The manifest variables we use in our latent variable models are based on three kinds of
measures. These are (1) codes representing postelection complaints filed with a committee
of the Bundestag, (2) several measures of strategic behavior, and (3) fraud parameters
estimated using a finite mixture likelihood variant of the Klimek et al. (2012) model.
9Eventually we also included all the complaints from 2005 and 2009, using each document’s first EIRS+
code—adapting the codes to the labeling typology (see section 3.1.1 and Data Appendix sections 6.1.1 and
6.1.2)—for the label.
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3.1 Postelection Complaints in Germany
As competitive elections are by definition contentious, that election disputes routinely arise
should be unsurprising. States handle these issues in a variety of ways, utilizing an array of
institutional forms. Disputed elections have a long history in Germany. A mandate for
Wahlpru¨fung (Election Verification) was first instituted in Germany in 1871 as part of the
constitution of the newly minted German Reich (Ziblatt 2009). This institution has
evolved over time and its current constitutional form was developed as part of the 1949
Grundgesetz (Basic Law). The Wahlpru¨fung concept, in its post World War II
configuration includes the Bundestag as initial arbiter for complaints and also allows for
complaints to be further forwarded to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional
Court). Since 1949, the Ausschuss fu¨r Wahlpru¨fung, Immunita¨t und Gescha¨ftsordnung
(AWIG; Committee for Election Verification, Immunity and Rules of Procedure) of the
Bundestag handles all complaints relating to federal elections in Germany10.
Any eligible voter may levy a complaint and the Bundestag investigates and issues a
decision in each case, provided the complaints meet certain requirements. Throughout a
given legislative session, the committee releases a series of recommendations that
summarize the complaints received and suggest ways in which Germany’s electoral laws
could be improved. These case summaries are quite detailed (some stretch on for tens of
thousands of words) and include a description of the events about which the citizen is
complaining and the reasoned decision of the committee. The number of complaints in a
given electoral period has varied tremendously since 1949, with the third Bundestag
(elected in 1957) hearing a low of six complaints whereas the thirteenth Bundestag (elected
in 1994) dealt with over 1400 complaints. There have typically been more complaints in
each legislative session since reunification than previously.
In contrast to other election complaint systems—such as that used in Mexico—political
10For ease of reading, we use “Germany” throughout, even though between 1949 and die Wende (reunifi-
cation) the Bundestag was only adjudicating disputes that took place in West Germany
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parties in Germany do not play a central role in the complaint process. Complainants tend
to be individuals who either directly experienced a failure of election administration or who
are otherwise dissatisfied with the prevailing electoral system or political order more
generally in Germany.
It is usually believed that election fraud is rare in Germany, but rare does not mean
nonexistent. The AWIG and hence the Bundestag has never overturned any election results
because of the complaints, although they did issue several recommendations on ways
Germany’s elections could be improved. One such situation involved the use of electronic
voting machines in 2005. Several complaints in 2005 question the use of certain electronic
voting machines due to their lack of a paper trail. The lack of a paper trail prevents voters
from being able to positively ascertain that their vote has been recorded correctly. While
the committee accepted the complaint as valid, it did not take any action to annul the
results as the complainants had not actually demonstrated that the results had been
manipulated using these machines. However, the committee did issue a recommendation
that called on the government to investigate the allegations made by the complainants
about the vulnerabilities of electronic voting (Bundestag 2000). The complainants would
go on to lodge a successful complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, which found
the use of such electronic voting technology unconstitutional.
The AWIG has a standard that unless a complaint is shown to be “mandatsrelevant”
the complaint will be rejected. To be mandatsrelevant, the circumstance a complaint
addresses must demonstrably change the composition of the Bundestag or make this a
possibility that cannot be ruled out (Ausschuss fu¨r Wahlpru¨fung, Immunita¨t und
Gescha¨ftsordnung 2013). The Bundestag ’s failure to act on a complaint does not
necessarily imply that the complaint is unfounded.
Facts motivating a complaint need not relate to election frauds in the sense of
maleficent acts that distort votes. Because complaints generally come from citizens and not
from political parties, they may be unlikely to result from partisan motivations. But some
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complaints are effectively partisan, such as those that relate to candidates’ inability to get
on the ballot, or would-be parties’ frustration at not being treated as parties. Citizens may
also act strategically with their complaints just as they do with their votes.
3.1.1 Classifying complaints
Previous efforts have examined only the number of complaints in a given district for a given
election, without considering the nature of each dispute (Ziblatt 2009; Breunig and Goerres
2011; Mares and Zhu 2015).11 As there are thousands of detailed complaints, manually
coding them would have been impractical, so we developed the active-learning framework
(see section 2.2) to machine-code these documents. The complaint labels are categories
slightly changed from Mebane and Klaver (2015), which were themselves adapted from the
coding scheme developed for the Election Incident Reporting System in the United States
(Verified Voting Foundation 2005; Hall 2005; Johnson 2005).12 The labels are as follows:
• Absentee-ballot related problem
• Registration related problem
• ID related problem
• Criminal status related problem
• Polling place problem
• Electoral System
• Party List Not on Ballot/Ballot Access Issues
• Problems with the creation of Party Lists
• Improper counting of the votes
• Improper Statistics
• Improper Campaign Activity/Allegations of Official Corruption
• Unspecified Other/No Subject
11While the scope of this paper is the post-war period, similar complaint data are available for the Reich-
stagwahlen between 1870 and 1911.
12Section 6.1.2 in the Data Appendix describes the earlier coding scheme.
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Detailed descriptions of this labeling scheme can be found in section 6.1.1 of the Data
Appendix. The performance of the SVM classifier by label class is reported in Table 1.
Overall we achieve average precision, recall and F-measure of .77, .75 and .74 respectively.
Categorizing the complaints by the type of violations they allege is productive because it
can allow the researcher to distinguish between different types of electoral irregularities.
Under this coding scheme, it is possible to ascertain whether the complainant was taking
issue with a particular administrative failure that they actually experienced or if their
complaint has more to do with the nature of the electoral system itself, i.e. they object to
a particular aspect of the system without alleging that any laws were broken.
3.1.2 Description of Classified Complaints
Our model classified over 2500 complaints submitted to the Bundestag between 1949 (the
beginning of the Federal Republic) and 2009. Several trends are immediately apparent.
Most obviously, as observed by Breunig and Goerres (2011), the number of complaints
received has drastically increased over time, especially since reunification in 1990
(Wahlperiode 12) (see Figure 1). For the first several decades of the Federal Republic
election disputes were uncommon. While these complaints increased marginally during the
1970s and 1980s, it was not until 1994 that complaint activity reached its peak. What sort
of electoral issues drove this increase?
Figure 2 displays the number of complaints received that fell into each complaint
category. Even with the log scale used for the counts in Figure 2, it is immediately
apparent that complaints relating to Germany’s electoral system are the most prevalent.
Complaints of this nature do not allege administrative wrongdoing, rather these
complainants express objections to Germany’s electoral laws themselves. These complaints
span a range of issues, but predominantly feature complaints about Germany’s 5%
threshold, about overhang mandates, and about negative vote weight.13 In particular, it is
13Negative vote-weight as enabled by overhang mandates was found unconstitutional by the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht in 2008 (Behnke 2010).
13
clear that these concerns drove the massive influx of complaints seen in 1994.
While complaints about the electoral system have always been prominent, there were
over 1000 complaints of this type received in 1994 alone. This could be due to any number
of reasons, however it is notable that the 1994 election was the first time that overhang
mandates appeared in consequential numbers.
Having noted that electoral system complaints make up a large portion of the dataset
as a whole, it is worth exploring the nature of the complaints that allege administrative
violations, such as issues with absentee ballots, registration issues, polling place problems,
etc. Figure 3 omits electoral system complaints, allegations of official corruption, and
complaints that contained no substantive information. Figure 4 shows the distribution of
the types of administrative complaints as percentages of all administrative complaints from
each election period since WP 12 (1990). Since reunification the most frequent
administrative complaints tend to concern absentee ballot problems, registration problems
and polling place problems. In contrast, the percentage distribution of all complaints since
1990, in Figure 5, shows the huge proportional surge of electoral system complaints in 1994
(WP 13) along with a similar proportional surge of complaints about improper campaign
activity or allegations of official corruption in 2002 (WP 15).
3.1.3 Manually Coded Complaints: 2005 and 2009
Two unusual events relating to election administration dominated public perceptions of the
federal election in 2005: mismatched Briefwahl (mail ballots) in Dortmund and a Nachwahl
(late election) in Dresden. For more details about these incidents see Mebane and Klaver
(2015). We capture the Dortmund and Dresden events as distinct types in the manually
coded data for 2005 but not in the machine-classified data for those years for which the
distributions are displayed in Figures 2–4. Note that the situation in Dresden was
controversial due to the strategic advantage held by those voters who would cast their
ballots already knowing the outcome in the rest of the country. That knowledge
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encouraged conservative voters to behave strategically and cast a “coalition vote,” i.e., to
cast their Erststimmen for the CDU and their Zweitstimmen for the FDP (Behnke 2008).
Mebane and Klaver (2015) manually code the complaint documents from 2005 and 2009
using a scheme that as much as possible follows the Election Incident Reporting System
(EIRS) coding scheme developed for elections in the United States (Verified Voting
Foundation 2005; Hall 2005; Johnson 2005). We use these so-called EIRS+ coded data in
the latent variable model. Eighteen EIRS+ types of complaints occur in 2005, plus types
referring to either Briefwahl in Dortmund or Nachwahl in Dresden. Sixteen types of
complaints occur in 2009.14
The manifest variable we use in the latent variable model for the complaints of type k
in district i is yki, which is a binary indicator for whether at least one complaint of type k
occurs for district i. As is more fully described in Mebane and Klaver (2015), sometimes
ambiguity about the district to which a complaint refers produces an ambiguous count of
the number of complaint instances.15 When the ambiguity is between a count of zero and a
positive value, ambiguity is induced in yki.
The ambiguity also produces variety in the totals of the binary indicators across
districts. Table 2 shows two total counts for each type of binary complaint indicator in
each year, the least that can occur and the most. For most types the two counts are the
same, and in a few instances the counts differ by one. Despite the variations, the types of
EIRS+ complaints that are the most frequent in 2005 are the same: Electoral System;
Absentee-ballot Related Problem; and Polling Place Problem. In 2009 Party List Not on
Ballot is the second most frequent complaint type, behind Electoral System, and
Absentee-ballot Related Problem is third.
14We describe the postelection complaint data collection and coding in more detail in section 6.1.2 of the
Data Appendix.
15See section 6.1.2 for description of the geographic location procedures.
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3.2 Measures of Strategic Behavior
Ample evidence exists to demonstrate that strategic voting occurs in the mixed system
used in German federal elections (Bawn 1999; Pappi and Thurner 2002; Gschwend 2007).
The Erststimmen, being plurality votes for a single winner, are affected by “wasted vote”
reasoning such as Cox (1994) analyzes. The proportional representation tier votes
(Zweitstimmen) exhibit “threshold insurance” strategic behavior intended to insure that
key smaller parties gain seats in the Bundestag (Herrmann and Pappi 2008; Shikano,
Herrmann and Thurner 2009).
As measures of strategic behavior we use variables that have been argued to measure
effects of strategic voting. Germany’s mixed system gives opportunity to observe different
distributions of votes being cast in the same district at the same time under both plurality
(Erststimme) and proportional representation (Zweitstimme) rules. The difference between
those votes is often used as a measure of strategic behavior (e.g. Cox 1997, 83; Bawn 1999).
For each of the five most prominent parties, we use variables defined as the proportion of
Zweitstimmen for a party in a district minus the proportion of Erststimmen in the same
district. The variables are denoted by ze-SPD, ze-CDUCSU, ze-FDP, ze-Green and ze-Left.
With the plurality election results alone, measures such as the difference between each
of the top two finisher’s and the third-place candidate’s votes connect to strategic behavior
(Cox 1994). We use two margin difference variables: the difference between the first-place
candidate’s proportion of Erststimmen and the third-place proportion (M13); and the
difference between the second- and third-place proportions (M23).
Pericchi and Torres (2011) argue that deviations in the distribution of the second
significant digits of votes signal frauds, but Mebane (2013, 2014) finds that the conditional
mean of the second significant digits of votes both for the winning and second-place
candidates in a plurality election varies in relation both to strategic behavior and to
district imbalances. We use the means of those two candidates’ polling station vote counts
as measures of strategic behavior. The second-digit mean for the winning candidate is
16
denoted jˆ1 and the second-digit mean for the second-place candidate is denoted jˆ2. Mebane
(2013, 2014) finds that patterns in which such means relate to strategic behavior and to
district imbalances exhibit complicated nonlinearities, so the second-digit means may not
fit well in our setting that imposes generalized linear functional forms. To the extent that
the means measure frauds, essential nonlinearities in their relationships to frauds may
reasonably be expected as well.
Some of the measures of strategic behavior seem to be related to one another, others
not. Scatterplots of the Zweitstimmen minus Erststimmen variables in 2005, in Figures 6,
show no apparent relationship across districts between ze-SPD and ze-CDUCSU, but as
ze-SPD increases ze-Green decreases and as ze-CDUCSU increases ze-FDP decreases.
Whether these patterns reflect the consequences of wasted-vote actions or of
threshold-insurance actions is of course not clear from the scatterplots. ze-Left shows
structure in its relationships to the Zweitstimmen minus Erststimmen differences for other
parties that is not easy to summarize.
The margin and second-digit mean variables do not appear to relate to one another in
any simple fashion. Scatterplots in Figure 7 show that in 2005 M13 relates somewhat
positively to M23. In addition the joint distribution of M13 and M23 appears to be roughly
bimodal, as the equilibrium analysis of Cox (1994) suggests it should be. The second-digit
mean variables jˆ1 and jˆ2 appear unrelated both to one another and to the margin variables.
Relating the Zweitstimmen minus Erststimmen, margin and second-digit mean
variables to one another in 2005 shows signs of some linear relationship between ze-SPD
and ze-CDUCSU, one the one hand, and M13 and M23, on the other (Figure 8). Some
relationship between these two kinds of variables is to be expected if wasted-vote actions
are part of why the Zweitstimmen proportions differ from the Erststimmen proportions.
But the relationships do not appear to be very strong, and the marginal distribution of
ze-SPD and ze-CDUCSU lacks the bimodality that is apparent in the distribution of M13
and M23. This may suggest that two very different kinds of strategies are at work in these
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elections: one, within each district, that is tied to wasted vote logic; and one, spanning the
whole election system, that connects to motives to ensure smaller parties’ gain seats in the
Bundestag and hence to threshold insurance. The second-digit mean measures appear
unrelated to the other variables.
3.3 “Fraud” Parameters
We use polling station vote count data from the 2005 and 2009 elections (Bundeswahlleiter
2010a,b) to estimate parameters fi, fe, α and θ (Mebane 2016) for the Erststimmen
(single-member district plurality rule votes) in each district.16 For each district i,
i = 1, . . . , 299, we obtain estimates fˆii, fˆei, αˆi and θˆi.
4 Latent Variable Model Estimation Results
The model specification we use features K = 6 common latent dimensions. Using more or
fewer common latent dimensions produces posterior distributions for the mean (ck and γ)
and loading (λkℓ) parameters that are severely multimodal, featuring parameters with both
positive and negative modes. Posteriors in the specifications we use are all unimodal and
for the most part symmetric.
We use complaints variables to set the scales for three of the common latent variables
(i.e., λkℓ = 1 and ck = 0) and we use variables that measure strategic behavior to set the
scales for the other three common latent variables. The variables we use to set the scales of
each common latent variable are as follows: ξ1, AbsenteeB; ξ2, Electoral; ξ3, PollingPl;
ξ4, ze-SPD; ξ5, ze-CDUCSU; ξ6, M13. The exploratory factor analysis loading pattern means
that while we use the named variables to set the scales of the common latent variables, we
are not doing anything to make sure that “complaint” manifest variables and “strategic”
manifest variables remain separated. A manifest variable we label as “strategic” may well
16Polling stations include both in-person (Urnenwahlbezirke) and mail (Briefwahlbezirke) vote districts.
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have a significantly nonzero loading for a common factor that otherwise is associated
primarily with “complaint” manifest variables, and vice versa. The interpretability of the
common latent variables is not guaranteed by a prespecified factor loading pattern.
The common latent variables are for the most part not correlated with one another, but
the nonzero covariances that do appear already raise questions about whether the
complaints variables can be sharply distinguished from the strategic variables. The pattern
of covariances between latent variables differs between 2005 and 2009. None of the
posterior means of the covariances between latent variables are exactly zero (see Φ = Υ−1
in Tables 3 and 4), but most of the covariances have 95% credible intervals that include
zero. The posterior means for the covariances for which the credible interval does not
include zero are shown in color: green for positive and red for negative. The four nonzero
covariances in 2005 are Φ16 (positive) and Φ14, Φ15 and Φ25 (negative). In 2009 the three
nonzero covariances are Φ46 (positive) and Φ15 and Φ36 (negative).
Nominal “complaints” latent variables are correlated with nominal “strategic” latent
variables. Expressed as correlations the posterior means of the covariances that are
significantly different from zero in 2005 are r16 = .40, r14 = −.40, r15 = −.47 and
r25 = −.49 and in 2009 they are r46 = .34, r15 = −.56 and r36 = −.49. In 2005 one of the
nominal “complaints” common latent variables (ξ1, whose scale is set by AbsenteeB) is
correlated with all three of the nominally “strategic” common latent variables: positively
with ξ6, whose scale is set by M13, and negatively with ξ4, whose scale is set by ze-SPD,
and with ξ5, whose scale is set by ze-CDUCSU. Also in 2005 nominal “complaints” variable
ξ2, whose scale is set by Electoral, is negatively correlated with ξ5. In 2009 ξ1 is
negatively correlated with ξ5, while nominal “strategic” variable ξ6 is negatively correlated
with nominal “complaints” variable ξ3, whose scale is set by PollingPl.
The patterns of factor loadings estimated for the two election periods differ, although in
both cases it appears that the finite mixture model parameters fˆii, αˆi and θˆi are connected
to strategic manifest variables via latent variables. In Tables 5–10, which show 95%
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credible intervals and posterior medians for the loading parameters λkℓ, loadings whose 95%
credible intervals contain all positive values are highlighted in green, and loadings whose
95% credible intervals contain all negative values are highlighted in red. The loadings that
are fixed to set the scales of the common latent variables are highlighted in gray.
In 2005 the factor loadings show that most of the complaints manifest variables, some
of the strategic manifest variables and one parameter of the finite mixture model positively
depend on the first common latent variable. Most of the complaints manifest variables
have significantly positive loadings on the first common latent variable, ξ1, including
Dortmund and Dresden (Table 5). Also loading positively on ξ1 are ze-SPD, ze-CDUCSU and
αˆi. M13 loads negatively on ξ1. ξ1 relates both to many complaint variables and to two of
the variables that measure vote switching between Erststimmen and
Zweitstimmen—between votes cast under plurality rules and votes cast under proportional
representation rules. ξ1 also relates to the finite mixture model parameter that calibrates
how much vote stealing as opposed to vote manufacturing occurs. That parameter, α, is
estimated to have a mean less than one—the posterior mean of αˆi = .7 (see Table 11). But
the positive value of λ131 means that as ξi increases αˆi increases, which implies a weaker
tendency for votes to go to each district’s leading party from the opposition parties in the
district. As ξi increases ze-SPD and ze-CDUCSU tend to increase as well: even more
proportional representation rule votes for the two largest parties than plurality rule votes.
The second common latent variable in 2005, ξ2, whose scale is set by Electoral, is
measured by most of the other complaints manifest variables and one of the strategic
variables (ze-CDUCSU). Loadings are in Table 5. All the loadings that have a definite sign
are positive. No finite mixture model parameter is clearly related to ξ2.
The third common latent variable, ξ3, whose scale is set by PollingPl, is measured by
several of the other complaints manifest variables, by jˆ2 and by fˆii and αˆi (see Table 6).
Neither Dortmund nor Dresden load clearly on ξ3. The fact that the complaints about
electronic voting technology are counted in the PollingPl variable may help focus
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interpretation of ξ3 as concerning problems with the accuracy of the results, but keep in
mind that there was no demonstration that the electronic systems caused distortions. jˆ2
ambiguously measures frauds and strategic behavior. The loadings for all the complaints
that have a definite sign and for jˆ2 are positive. Both fˆii and αˆi have negative loadings. As
ξ3 increases incremental fraud becomes less likely, although the tendency for votes to go
from opposition parties to the leading party in each district becomes stronger.
The fourth, fifth and sixth common latent variables in 2005 each have only few
complaints manifest variables that load on them with a definite sign, but all are positively
related to fˆii, αˆi or both. All three latent variables have their scales set by a strategic
manifest variable. ξ4 has scale set by ze-SPD, relates positively to two complaints manifest
variables (BallotRel and Disabilit) and relates positively to both fˆii and αˆi (Table 6).
ξ5 has scale set by ze-CDUCSU, relates positively to two complaints manifest variables
(PartyList and Registrat), negatively to Dresden and positively to both fˆii and αˆi
(Table 7).17 ξ6 has scale set by M13, relates positively to Dortmund and to fˆii. The three
nominally “strategic” latent variables all relate positively to parameters of the finite
mixture model.
In 2009 the factor loading pattern is arguably simpler, if only because it varies less
across common latent variables. θˆi loads positively on all the common latent variables, and
almost all the strategic manifest variables load positively on all the common latent
variables as well (Tables 8–10). fˆii loads with a definite sign (positive) only on the first
common latent variable, and αˆi never loads with a definite sign on any common latent
variable. As far as complaints manifest variables are concerned, all of them load positively
on ξ1 and most of them load positively on ξ2, ξ3 and ξ4. Two of the complaints manifest
variables load positively on ξ5 and three of them load positively on ξ6. No complaints
manifest variable has a loading that is definitely negative. Much as the strategic variables
17The negative loading for Dresden is understandable because the Nachwahl in Dresden presented a
strategic opportunity for conservative voters who favored the CDU-CSU and the FDP but not for those with
preferences more to the left.
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are intricately related to the complaints variables via the common latent variable structure,
so is the magnitude of “frauds” that would be estimated by the finite mixture model. The θ
parameter is important for determining the magnitude estimated for frauds (Mebane 2016).
The substantial difference in the latent variable structure between 2005 and 2009 seems
to go with a difference between the way strategic voting operated in the two elections. The
2005 election produced a Grand Coalition between the largest parties (CDU/CSU and
SPD), while 2009 did not. In 2009 FDP gained in Zweitstimmen much more than they had
in 2005. In terms of statistical indicators, the posterior mean of M23 is positive in 2005 but
not in 2009 (Tables 11 and 12), which suggests there was more strategic vote switching in
Erststimmen in 2005 than in 2009. jˆ1 is significantly greater than 4.187 in 2005 but not in
2009, which has the same implication as do the means for M23 (Mebane 2013, 2014).
Overall, strategic dimensions of the data are related to dimensions that connect the
various complaints. If the complaints manifest variables are plausibly interpreted as
connected to frauds, then frauds are related to strategies in ways that the essentially linear
relationships in the model can capture. Covariances occur between complaint-related and
strategic common latent variables. Manifest variables of one broad type—complaint-related
or strategic—load on common latent variables whose scale is set by a variable of the other
broad type. The relations across broad types are not enough to make it impossible to
characterize common latent variables as being essentially of one broad type or the other,
but boundaries are not sharp.
The finite mixture model parameters relate to both complaint-related and strategic
common latent variables. In the elections of 2005 and 2009, the finite mixture model
measures both frauds—to the extent that the complaints can be considered as referring to
frauds—and strategic behavior.
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5 Discussion
If the complaints variables and the latent variables they have in common reflect real
irregularities in the administration of the election, do the relationships between those
latent variables and fˆii, αˆi and θˆi suggest that fˆii, αˆi and θˆi merit being described as
“fraud” parameters? In both the 2005 and 2009 German federal elections, the loadings for
these parameter estimates suggest that the estimates do relate in a meaningful way to
irregularities. Whether these irregularities should be called frauds is an interpretive matter
we will not try to resolve. But the parameters also relate to measures of strategic voting.
The “fraud” parameters in the 2005 and 2009 elections are ambiguous. When fˆii, αˆi or θˆi
are large, it is not clear whether the reason is that something went wrong with the voting
or that voters themselves moved the votes around by acting strategically.
The parameters of the finite mixture model inspired by Klimek et al. (2012) that
purport to measure the probability of election frauds sometimes also respond to strategic
voting. The Klimek et al. (2012) parameters describe particular bimodal and trimodal
distributions that are viewed as “unusual.” But such distributions might arise as a matter
of course, because of voters’ strategic behavior (Mebane 2016). Strategic behavior being
essential in politics, perhaps multimodal distributions should not be viewed as being
generically odd.
Even though we performed analysis to relate complaints to the finite mixture model’s
parameters only for 2005 and 2009, we think our machine-assisted classification of
complaints from 1949 through 2009 raises questions about how the complaints are
interpreted by Breunig and Goerres (2011) and perhaps by Ziblatt (2009) and Mares and
Zhu (2015), although the interpretation in the latter two pieces is supported by the
historical research of Arsenschek (2003). Plainly a large proportion of the complaints
during 1949–2009 express dissatisfaction with the electoral system and do not address
specific failures in administering the election. Administrative failures can easily be or mask
for election frauds, but it is more challenging to interpret the election system itself as
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fraudulent. An election system may lack integrity (Norris 2014), but electoral integrity
includes much more than administrative failures or frauds. Using the simple count of
complaints to measure frauds fails to discriminate administrative problems from other
concerns. It also introduces potential confusion due to many people complaining about the
same incident—a problem we have tried to minimize in the latent variable analysis by
reducing the complaints to binary indicators for each election district. We will use the
same plan when we extend the latent variable analysis to other years’ data.
Our latent variable analysis suggests that estimates of the “fraud” model parameters fi,
α and θ do relate meaningfully to the irregularities that provoke election complaints to the
Bundestag in German elections. Whether the incidents that provoke the complaints should
be described as “frauds” is a matter of interpretation, but the model that includes fi, α
and θ appear to be a valid but not perfect tool for measuring those incidents. That is, to
be a bit more precise, the bimodal and trimodal distributions that the Klimek et al. (2012)
model highlights appear to be valid but not perfect measures of the “frauds” that occur in
German federal elections.
6 Appendices
The Data Appendix describes labels used in our classification algorithm and the original
EIRS+ codes and data in greater detail. The Model Appendix reports BUGS code used for
MCMC estimation of the latent variable models using OpenBUGS (Lunn, Spiegelhalter,
Thomas and Best 2009; OpenBUGS 2013; Lunn, Jackson, Best, Thomas and Spiegelhalter
2013), along with tables that report credible intervals for means in the models.
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6.1 Data Appendix
6.1.1 German complaints data (1949–2009)
Sources: One of the standing committees of the Bundestag is the Ausschuss fu¨r
Wahlpru¨fung, Immunita¨t und Gescha¨ftsordnung (Committee for Election Verification,
Immunity and Rules of Procedure). This committee deals with the rules of the Bundestag,
possible criminal proceedings against Bundestag members and complaints about the
administration of national elections (Bundestagswahlen, Europawahlen, etc.).
Complaint Typology Here is a list of all of the labels we applied to the complaint
documents. They translate the nature of the complaint as presented in the long-form text
into a more database-friendly form. Labels that are identical to a code in the EIRS+
scheme described in section 6.1.2 are marked.
• Absentee-ballot related problem: cases where complainants did not receive their absentee
ballot, their absentee ballot came late, or where there were any other problems related to
the preparation or administration of absentee voting. (EIRS+)
• Registration related problem: cases where complainants were not able to vote or request an
absentee ballot due to problems with their registration (not registered at all or they were
registered in a different location) or in cases where there were problems mailing the
Wahlbenachrichtungen (letters that notify registered German voters when an upcoming
election will take place and where they are supposed to vote). (EIRS+)
• ID related problem: as Germany does not have strict voter ID laws, many complainants
demanded a more robust process for checking the identity of voters at the polling place.
(EIRS+)
• Criminal status related problem: cases where problems with the administration of federal
elections in prisons were alleged. (EIRS+)
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• Polling place problem: includes problems related to the built environment of the polling
place, the set-up of the voting booths and other temporary election structures, as well as
problems with polling place workers. A few examples of issues with the built environment
of a polling place would be the presence of surveillance cameras or an elevated balustrade
that could hypothetically allow people to observe voters in the voting booths. Also includes
complaints about political advertising displayed too close to a polling place and ballot
related issues that made it difficult to protect electoral secrecy.
• Electoral System: includes complaints relating to aspects of the German electoral system
(overhang mandates, the 5% threshold, the method used for turning votes into seats, etc.).
Also includes complaints that do not criticize a specific aspect of the German electoral
system, rather a broader issue that is related to the electoral system; these complaints
generally do not allege wrongdoing, rather they signify dissatisfaction with the laws
governing Germany’s elections or political system more generally.
• Party List Not on Ballot/Ballot Access Issues: For the proportional representation portion
of Germany’s mixed electoral system, they use closed party lists at the state level. Election
officials must approve parties in order for them to appear on the ballot, consequently many
parties whose party lists were not recognized by the Bundeswahlleiter (and therefore did
not appear as options under the second vote) complained about this impediment. This
category also includes complaints from independent candidates about their location on the
ballot or number of signatures required to get one’s name on the ballot and complaints
from candidates alleging that ballot design unfairly disadvantaged them.
• Problems with the creation of Party Lists: cases where complainants claim that party lists
were improperly prepared. In Germany, the candidates and their order on the individual
Landlists are determined by the parties themselves at a mass gathering of each party.
(EIRS+)
• Counting of the votes: any complaint that alleges inconsistencies in vote counts or improper
procedures in the preparation of those counts. (EIRS+)
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• Improper Statistics: any complaint that alleges the violation of the secret ballot through the
preparation of certain election statistics. In Germany, the most salient of these statistics is
the Repra¨sentative Wahlstatistik (Representative Election Statistic). This determines the
voting patterns of Germans differentiated by sex and age range, which is accomplished
through sampling precincts throughout Germany by having them distribute marked ballots
(these ballots indicate the voter’s sex and age-range). This process is controversial, as
numerous complainants objected to the perceived invasion of privacy. (EIRS+)
• Improper Campaign Activity/Allegations of Official Corruption: complaints that accuse
government officials of involvement in various corruption schemes, previous activity in the
Ministerium fu¨r Staatssicherheit, or otherwise challenges their eligibility to serve in the
Bundestag. This category does not include allegations against poll workers, which would be
labeled as a polling place problem. This category includes instances where the complainant
felt that any of the parties’ campaigns were conducted in an inappropriate manner. Finally,
this category also includes complaints that allege improprieties or violations at the party
conventions where they select their district candidates and finalize their party lists.
• Unspecified Other/No Subject: includes complaints where the nature of the complaint was
not given (e.g. numerous complainants filed petitions consisting merely of “I dispute the
1990 Bundestagswahl” without any further elaboration) or documents in which the
complainant never connects their complaint to any aspect of the electoral system or its
administration).
6.1.2 Initial coding scheme (for 2005 and 2009 only)
Sources: All of the complaints data come from the archives of the Bundestag ’s website.
The “Drucksache” field represents the document number in the form “Election
Period/Document Number.” There is also a file number associated with every complaint in
the form “WP XX/Election Year.” The Drucksache field and the file number allow for the
easy finding of the original complaint’s text. The name, location, and reason fields are all
taken directly from the original documents published by the relevant Bundestag
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committee. The “EIRS Coded Reason” borrows from the Election Incident Reporting
System (Verified Voting Foundation 2005; Hall 2005; Johnson 2005), with a few additions
necessitated by the vagaries of the German electoral system and the type of complaints
that it precipitates. To determine the Wahlkreis ( district) that corresponds with the zip
code given for each case, we use a shapefile of German zip codes18 in conjunction with a
shapefile that shows the district boundaries for the relevant election (occasionally, these
borders were unclear, most likely due to projection differences between the two shapefiles).
It should be noted that the locations given in the files are only the location of the
complainant, i.e., it is entirely possible for someone to complain about an issue that they
themselves did not experience—standing is not an issue.
EIRS+ Codes: Here is a list of the reason codes we applied to the hand-coded
complaints data that differ from those used in the machine classification algorithm. All the
categories previously marked “EIRS+” are also used. These codes translate the nature of
the complaint as presented in the long-form text into a more database-friendly form.
• Improper Campaigning Influence: cases where the complainant encountered improper
campaign advertising (for example, advertising too close to a polling place) or felt that any
of the parties’ campaigns were conducted in an otherwise inappropriate, if not necessarily
illegal, manner.
• Disability access problem: cases where polling places or other voting-related buildings were
not accessible to the disabled.
• Ballot related problem: all complaints related to the physical characteristics of the ballot
and its design (the size of the ballot, the color of the ballot, the folding of the ballot, etc.)
• Polling place problem: includes problems related to the built environment of the polling
place, the set-up of the voting booths and other temporary election structures, as well as
problems with polling place workers. A few examples of problems with the built
18See http://arnulf.us/PLZ.
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environment of a polling place would be the presence of surveillance cameras or an elevated
balustrade that could hypothetically allow people to observe voters in the voting booths.
• Electoral System: includes complaints relating to specific aspects of the German electoral
system (overhang mandates, the 5% threshold, the method used for turning votes into
seats, etc.) Also includes complaints that do not criticize a specific aspect of the German
electoral system, rather a broader issue that is related to the electoral system.
• Party List Not on Ballot/Other Ballot Access Issues: many parties whose party lists were
not recognized by the Bundeswahlleiter (and therefore did not appear as options under the
second vote) complained about this impediment. This category also includes complaints
from independent candidates about their placement on the ballot.
• Improper District Boundaries: indicates a complaint that alleged improprieties in the
drawing of district boundaries
• Allegations of Official Corruption: complaints that accuse various government officials of
involvement in various corruption schemes (this does not include allegations of
improprieties against poll workers)
• Police Harassment: complaints of this type allege that the police improperly interfered in
some aspect of the electoral process. Specifically, the complaints in 2005 allege that the
police impeded the legal activities of an aspiring political party
• Voter Intimidation: complaints of this type allege intimidation by polling place officials or
other persons that occurred while the complainant was casting their ballot (whether
in-person or via the Briefwahl)
• Unspecified Other: includes complaints where the nature of the complaint could not be
ascertained or non-sequitur complaints.
Many of the codes that originate with EIRS are closely related (for example, many
complaints coded under “Absentee-ballot related problem” involve problems with voter
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registration and as such could also be coded as “Registration related problems”). The same
issue presents itself with many of the codes developed specifically for the German case, as
they deal with numerous specific complaints about the electoral system.
To determine how to code the reason for the complaint, we consulted the “Betreff ”
(subject) field that is contained in the original Bundestag files, in the table of contents
alongside the corresponding file number. This field gives an approximation of the nature of
the complaint as parsed by the committee. The documents also contain the specifics of
every complaint as well as the response of the committee. As such, both the complaints
and the committee’s responses can be quite lengthy. The four documents—17/2250,
17/3100, 17/4600 and 17/6300—that relate to the 2009 Bundestagswahl are 56, 212, 136,
and 144 pages long respectively. The reason codes in the database take into account both
the subject of the complaint as assigned in the table of contents and the broader
enumeration of the complaint found in the body of the document.
Some complaints are assigned multiple “reason” codes (up to six). This is usually
precipitated by a telltale “u.a.” (“unter anderem,” meaning among others) in the original
Betreff of the complaint. The precise nature of each multifaceted complaint is completely
enumerated in the main text of each complaint, as opposed to the Betreff. In order to
receive multiple codes, a complaint had to enumerate multiple complaints that involved
multiple EIRS+ codes, not simply multiple aspects of the same code. For example, in 2009
many people complained about overhang mandates, a complaint that was coded under
“Electoral System.” Many people also complained about the distribution of seats, which
would also fall under an “Electoral System” complaint. In some cases, these complaints
involved both the division of seats and overhang mandates, in which case the complaint
was still simply coded as a single “Electoral System” complaint, regardless of the fact that
there are two complaints about the electoral system. The codes are designed to show the
subjects of the complaints, as opposed to their multiplicity.
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Locating the complaints in electoral districts: To determine the district from which
the complaint emanated, we use the postal codes given in the documents from the
Bundestag in conjunction with several sets of shapefiles (one that shows the distribution of
postal codes across Germany and the other that shows the division of the districts in a
given Bundestag election). It should be noted that the locations given in the files are only
the location of the complainant, i.e., it is entirely possible for someone to complain about
an issue that they themselves did not experience—standing is not an issue.
Some complaints involved a more complex procedure for determining their geographic
assignment. This is caused by the discrepancy in scale between the shapefile that displays
all of Germany’s zip codes and that which shows the boundaries of each district. There are
significantly many more zip codes in Germany than districts, and occasionally it is difficult
to discern whether the zip code in question is actually divided between districts or whether
an apparent division is just an artifact of laying two differently scaled maps over one
another. This problem is especially acute in the larger cities where there are often dozens
upon dozens of zip codes. In some cases, due to the shape of both the district and zip code
in question, it is clear that the discrepancy is purely a cartographic issue. In other cases,
more investigation is required to determine whether a zip code straddles multiple districts.
To overcome this issue, we developed a procedure that takes this ambiguity into
account. For zip codes that span multiple Wahlkreise, the relative portion of a given zip
code’s area that is in each Wahlkreis is used to develop weights that determine the
likelihood of a complaint being located in a given district. These weights are determined by
the size of the population in the portion of one zip code that is in a given Wahlkreis. The
population numbers are the number of registered voters in each portion of the zip code
that is coincident with a specific Wahlkreis. To determine the number of registered voters
contained in a zip code and then subdivide this number between the Wahlkreise contained
therein, we used a combination of zip code shapefiles and precinct shapefiles, augmented to
include precinct-level voting data from the election in question. The procedures are
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detailed in Mebane and Klaver (2015).
In the latent variable analysis we treat the complaints and their location in a binary
way. The types of disputes are aggregated to the district level: if there is a positive number
of complaints of a certain type then the whole district receives a “1” for that type, and if
there are no complaints of a certain type in a district then it receives a “0”. If the count of
complaints is positive only because one of the possible locations of a geographically
ambiguous complaint is a particular district, then we have an instance where we are
uncertain about the assignment of a complaint to a district; in such instances we are
uncertain about whether the observation yki should be yki = 0 or yki = 1 (recall page 5).
Despite the fact that there are districts with more than one complaint of the same type,
we decided that considering the multiplicity of a particular type of complaint in a given
district would be ill-advised for several reasons. The first is that the complaint data was
coded not to represent the number of complaints of a certain type in a district, but to
illuminate the type of complaints levied by citizens in a given district. In many cases,
determining the precise number of disputes of the same type contained in a given
complaint is a nebulous task, as often these disputes are inextricably related to one
another. This is especially true of complaints that allege the unconstitutionality of various
aspects of the electoral system. Second, considering the multiplicity of complaints could
bias the analysis in favor of well-publicized problems with electoral administration. Just
because more people filed complaints of a given nature does not mean that these
complaints are more valid or serious than a complaint filed by just one individual. One
example where the preceding logic would be less applicable would be in a situation where
many individuals allege that their votes had not been counted or that they had otherwise
been illegally barred from voting. This is not the case regarding the German disputes,
however. Third, even in districts where relatively more complaints originated, the number
of complainants still represents a tiny percentage of the population and reading too much
into the sheer number of complaints risks distorting the resulting model.
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6.2 Model Appendix
6.2.1 BUGS Code
The code we use with OpenBUGS (Lunn et al. 2009; OpenBUGS 2013; Lunn et al. 2013) to
run the MCMC algorithms is as follows.
2005:
model{
for(i in 1:N){
for (j in 1:20) {
# geo location indicator
L[i,j] ~ dcat(pi[i,j,1:2])
# prior for mixture probability vector
alpha[i,j,1] <- w1[i,j]
alpha[i,j,2] <- w2[i,j]
pi[i,j,1:2] ~ ddirch(alpha[i,j,1:2])
}
for (j in 21:29) {
z1[i,j+4] ~ dnorm(mu[i,j], psi[j])
}
alphapos[i] <- 1 + equals(z1[i,22],0)
alphamu[i,2] <- 0
alphapsi[i,2] <- 1
alphamu[i,1] <- mu[i,22+9]
alphapsi[i,1] <- psi[30]
z1[i,22] ~ dnorm(alphamu[i, alphapos[i]], alphapsi[i, alphapos[i]])
thetapos[i] <- 1 + equals(z1[i,23],0)
thetamu[i,2] <- 1
thetapsi[i,2] <- 1
thetamu[i,1] <- exp(mu[i,23+9])
thetapsi[i,1] <- psi[31]
itheta[i] <- 1/z1[i,23]
itheta[i] ~ dgamma(thetamu[i,thetapos[i]], thetapsi[i,thetapos[i]])
#measurement equation model
for(j in 1:20){
r[i,j] <- L[i,j]-1
y1[i,j]~dnorm(mu[i,j],psi[j])I(thd[1,z1[i,j]],thd[1,z1[i,j]+1])
y2[i,j]~dnorm(mu[i,j],psi[j])I(thd[1,z2[i,j]],thd[1,z2[i,j]+1])
y[i,j] <- r[i,j]*y1[i,j] + (1-r[i,j])*y2[i,j]
ephat[i,j]<-y[i,j]-mu[i,j]
}
# "zero trick" Dirichlet likelihoods for fraud probabilities
for (j in 1:1) {
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p[i,j]<-exp(mu[i,j+29])/(1+exp(mu[i,30]))
theta[i,j] <- p[i,j]*z1[i,24]
lGtheta[i,j] <- loggam(theta[i,j])
thp[i,j] <- (theta[i,j]-1)*log(z1[i,j+20])
ephat[i,j+29]<-z1[i,j+20]-theta[i,j]/(theta[i,1]+theta[i,2])
}
theta[i,2] <- (1-p[i,1])*z1[i,24]
lGtheta[i,2] <- loggam(theta[i,2])
thp[i,2] <- (theta[i,2]-1)*log(1-z1[i,21])
logL[i] <- loggam(theta[i,1]+theta[i,2])-(lGtheta[i,1]+lGtheta[i,2])+(thp[i,1]+thp[i,2])
Zero[i] <- 0
Zero[i] ~ dpois(Dphi[i])
Dphi[i] <- -logL[i] + 100
# four factors
mu[i,1]<- xi[i,1]
mu[i,2]<- lam[1]*xi[i,1] + lam[29]*xi[i,2] + lam[56]*xi[i,3] + lam[82]*xi[i,4] +
lam[107]*xi[i,5] + lam[131]*xi[i,6] +c[1] # Allegatio
mu[i,3]<- lam[2]*xi[i,1] + lam[30]*xi[i,2] + lam[57]*xi[i,3] + lam[83]*xi[i,4] +
lam[108]*xi[i,5] + lam[132]*xi[i,6] +c[2] # Ballotrel
mu[i,4]<- lam[3]*xi[i,1] + lam[31]*xi[i,2] + lam[58]*xi[i,3] + lam[84]*xi[i,4] +
lam[109]*xi[i,5] + lam[133]*xi[i,6] +c[3] # Countingo
mu[i,5]<- lam[4]*xi[i,1] + lam[32]*xi[i,2] + lam[59]*xi[i,3] + lam[85]*xi[i,4] +
lam[110]*xi[i,5] + lam[134]*xi[i,6] +c[4] # Criminals
mu[i,6]<- lam[5]*xi[i,1] + lam[33]*xi[i,2] + lam[60]*xi[i,3] + lam[86]*xi[i,4] +
lam[111]*xi[i,5] + lam[135]*xi[i,6] +c[5] # Disabilit
mu[i,7]<- lam[6]*xi[i,1] + xi[i,2]
mu[i,8]<- lam[7]*xi[i,1] + lam[34]*xi[i,2] + lam[61]*xi[i,3] + lam[87]*xi[i,4] +
lam[112]*xi[i,5] + lam[136]*xi[i,6] +c[6] # IDrelated
mu[i,9]<- lam[8]*xi[i,1] + lam[35]*xi[i,2] + lam[62]*xi[i,3] + lam[88]*xi[i,4] +
lam[113]*xi[i,5] + lam[137]*xi[i,6] +c[7] # ImproperC
mu[i,10]<-lam[9]*xi[i,1] + lam[36]*xi[i,2] + lam[63]*xi[i,3] + lam[89]*xi[i,4] +
lam[114]*xi[i,5] + lam[138]*xi[i,6] +c[8] # ImproperD
mu[i,11]<-lam[10]*xi[i,1] + lam[37]*xi[i,2] + lam[64]*xi[i,3] + lam[90]*xi[i,4] +
lam[115]*xi[i,5] + lam[139]*xi[i,6] +c[9] # ImproperS
mu[i,12]<-lam[11]*xi[i,1] + lam[38]*xi[i,2] + lam[65]*xi[i,3] + lam[91]*xi[i,4] +
lam[116]*xi[i,5] + lam[140]*xi[i,6] +c[10] # PartyList
mu[i,13]<-lam[12]*xi[i,1] + lam[39]*xi[i,2] + lam[66]*xi[i,3] + lam[92]*xi[i,4] +
lam[117]*xi[i,5] + lam[141]*xi[i,6] +c[11] # PoliceHar
mu[i,14]<-lam[13]*xi[i,1] + lam[40]*xi[i,2] + xi[i,3]
mu[i,15]<-lam[14]*xi[i,1] + lam[41]*xi[i,2] + lam[67]*xi[i,3] + lam[93]*xi[i,4] +
lam[118]*xi[i,5] + lam[142]*xi[i,6] +c[12] # Problemwi
mu[i,16]<-lam[15]*xi[i,1] + lam[42]*xi[i,2] + lam[68]*xi[i,3] + lam[94]*xi[i,4] +
lam[119]*xi[i,5] + lam[143]*xi[i,6] +c[13] # Registrat
mu[i,17]<-lam[16]*xi[i,1] + lam[43]*xi[i,2] + lam[69]*xi[i,3] + lam[95]*xi[i,4] +
lam[120]*xi[i,5] + lam[144]*xi[i,6] +c[14] # Unspecifi
mu[i,18]<-lam[17]*xi[i,1] + lam[44]*xi[i,2] + lam[70]*xi[i,3] + lam[96]*xi[i,4] +
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lam[121]*xi[i,5] + lam[145]*xi[i,6] +c[15] # Voterinti
mu[i,19]<-lam[18]*xi[i,1] + lam[45]*xi[i,2] + lam[71]*xi[i,3] + lam[97]*xi[i,4] +
lam[122]*xi[i,5] + lam[146]*xi[i,6] +c[16] # Dortmund
mu[i,20]<-lam[19]*xi[i,1] + lam[46]*xi[i,2] + lam[72]*xi[i,3] + lam[98]*xi[i,4] +
lam[123]*xi[i,5] + lam[147]*xi[i,6] +c[17] # Dresden
mu[i,21]<-lam[20]*xi[i,1] + lam[47]*xi[i,2] + lam[73]*xi[i,3] + xi[i,4]
mu[i,22]<-lam[21]*xi[i,1] + lam[48]*xi[i,2] + lam[74]*xi[i,3] + lam[99]*xi[i,4] +
xi[i,5] # CDUCSU
mu[i,23]<-lam[22]*xi[i,1] + lam[49]*xi[i,2] + lam[75]*xi[i,3] + lam[100]*xi[i,4] +
lam[124]*xi[i,5] + lam[148]*xi[i,6] +c[18] # FDP
mu[i,24]<-lam[23]*xi[i,1] + lam[50]*xi[i,2] + lam[76]*xi[i,3] + lam[101]*xi[i,4] +
lam[125]*xi[i,5] + lam[149]*xi[i,6] +c[19] # GR.NE
mu[i,25]<-lam[24]*xi[i,1] + lam[51]*xi[i,2] + lam[77]*xi[i,3] + lam[102]*xi[i,4] +
lam[126]*xi[i,5] + lam[150]*xi[i,6] +c[20] # DIE.LINKE
mu[i,26]<-lam[25]*xi[i,1] + lam[52]*xi[i,2] + lam[78]*xi[i,3] + lam[103]*xi[i,4] +
lam[127]*xi[i,5] + xi[i,6] # fmt
mu[i,27]<-lam[26]*xi[i,1] + lam[53]*xi[i,2] + lam[79]*xi[i,3] + lam[104]*xi[i,4] +
lam[128]*xi[i,5] + lam[151]*xi[i,6] +c[21] # smt
mu[i,28]<-lam[27]*xi[i,1] + lam[54]*xi[i,2] + lam[80]*xi[i,3] + lam[105]*xi[i,4] +
lam[129]*xi[i,5] + lam[152]*xi[i,6] +c[22] # dwinner
mu[i,29]<-lam[28]*xi[i,1] + lam[55]*xi[i,2] + lam[81]*xi[i,3] + lam[106]*xi[i,4] +
lam[130]*xi[i,5] + lam[153]*xi[i,6] +c[23] # dsecond
mu[i,30]<-lam[154]*xi[i,1] + lam[155]*xi[i,2] + lam[156]*xi[i,3] + lam[157]*xi[i,4] +
lam[158]*xi[i,5] + lam[159]*xi[i,6] +c[24] # fi
mu[i,31]<-lam[160]*xi[i,1] + lam[161]*xi[i,2] + lam[162]*xi[i,3] + lam[163]*xi[i,4] +
lam[164]*xi[i,5] + lam[165]*xi[i,6] +c[25] # alpha
mu[i,32]<-lam[166]*xi[i,1] + lam[167]*xi[i,2] + lam[168]*xi[i,3] + lam[169]*xi[i,4] +
lam[170]*xi[i,5] + lam[171]*xi[i,6] +c[26] # theta
#structural equation model
xi[i,1:6]~dmnorm(u[1:6],phi[1:6,1:6])
}# end of i
#thresholds
for(j in 1:20){
thd[j,1]<-alpbot
thd[j,2]<-alpmid
thd[j,3]<-alptop
}
for(i in 1:6){u[i]<-gam[i]}
#priors on loadings and coefficients
var.lam[1]<-4.0*psi[1] var.lam[2]<-4.0*psi[2] var.lam[3]<-4.0*psi[3]
var.lam[4]<-4.0*psi[4] var.lam[5]<-4.0*psi[5] var.lam[6]<-4.0*psi[6]
var.lam[7]<-4.0*psi[7] var.lam[8]<-4.0*psi[8] var.lam[9]<-4.0*psi[9]
var.lam[10]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[11]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[12]<-4.0*psi[12]
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var.lam[13]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[14]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[15]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[16]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[17]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[18]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[19]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[20]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[21]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[22]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[23]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[24]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[25]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[26]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[27]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[28]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[29]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[30]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[31]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[32]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[33]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[34]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[35]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[36]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[37]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[38]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[39]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[40]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[41]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[42]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[43]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[44]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[45]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[46]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[47]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[48]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[49]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[50]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[51]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[52]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[53]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[54]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[55]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[56]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[57]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[58]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[59]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[60]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[61]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[62]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[63]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[64]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[65]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[66]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[67]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[68]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[69]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[70]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[71]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[72]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[73]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[74]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[75]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[76]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[77]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[78]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[79]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[80]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[81]<-4.0*psi[21]
for (k in 82:106){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[13]}
for (k in 107:130){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[14]}
for (k in 131:153){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[15]}
for (k in 154:159){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[16]}
for (k in 160:165){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[17]}
for (k in 166:171){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[18]}
for(i in 1:171){lam[i]~dnorm(0.8,var.lam[i])}
var.b<-4.0*psi[1]
for(j in 1:6){gam[j]~dnorm(0.1,var.b)}
var.c<-4.0*psi[2]
for(j in 1:26){c[j]~dnorm(0.1,var.c)}
for(j in 1:2){
psg[j]~dgamma(10,8)
}
#priors on precisions
for(j in 1:P){
psi[j]~dgamma(10,8)
sgm[j]<-1/psi[j]
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}phi[1:6,1:6]~dwish(R[1:6,1:6], 30)
phx[1:6,1:6]<-inverse(phi[1:6,1:6])
} #end of model
2009:
model{
for(i in 1:N){
for (j in 1:16) {
# geo location indicator
L[i,j] ~ dcat(pi[i,j,1:2])
# prior for mixture probability vector
alpha[i,j,1] <- w1[i,j]
alpha[i,j,2] <- w2[i,j]
pi[i,j,1:2] ~ ddirch(alpha[i,j,1:2])
}
for (j in 17:25) {
z1[i,j+5] ~ dnorm(mu[i,j], psi[j])
}
alphapos[i] <- 1 + equals(z1[i,19],0)
alphamu[i,2] <- 0
alphapsi[i,2] <- 1
alphamu[i,1] <- mu[i,27]
alphapsi[i,1] <- psi[26]
z1[i,19] ~ dnorm(alphamu[i, alphapos[i]], alphapsi[i, alphapos[i]])
thetapos[i] <- 1 + equals(z1[i,20],0)
thetamu[i,2] <- 1
thetapsi[i,2] <- 1
thetamu[i,1] <- exp(mu[i,28])
thetapsi[i,1] <- psi[27]
itheta[i] <- 1/z1[i,20]
itheta[i] ~ dgamma(thetamu[i,thetapos[i]], thetapsi[i,thetapos[i]])
#measurement equation model
for(j in 1:16){
r[i,j] <- L[i,j]-1
y1[i,j]~dnorm(mu[i,j],psi[j])I(thd[1,z1[i,j]],thd[1,z1[i,j]+1])
y2[i,j]~dnorm(mu[i,j],psi[j])I(thd[1,z2[i,j]],thd[1,z2[i,j]+1])
y[i,j] <- r[i,j]*y1[i,j] + (1-r[i,j])*y2[i,j]
ephat[i,j]<-y[i,j]-mu[i,j]
}
# "zero trick" Dirichlet likelihoods for fraud probabilities
for (j in 1:1) {
p[i,j]<-exp(mu[i,j+25])/(1+exp(mu[i,26]))
theta[i,j] <- p[i,j]*z1[i,21]
lGtheta[i,j] <- loggam(theta[i,j])
37
thp[i,j] <- (theta[i,j]-1)*log(z1[i,j+16])
ephat[i,j+16]<-z1[i,j+16]-theta[i,j]/(theta[i,1]+theta[i,2])
}
theta[i,2] <- (1-p[i,1])*z1[i,21]
lGtheta[i,2] <- loggam(theta[i,2])
thp[i,2] <- (theta[i,2]-1)*log(1-z1[i,17])
logL[i] <- loggam(theta[i,1]+theta[i,2])-(lGtheta[i,1]+lGtheta[i,2])+(thp[i,1]+thp[i,2])
Zero[i] <- 0
Zero[i] ~ dpois(Dphi[i])
Dphi[i] <- -logL[i] + 100
# three factors
mu[i,1]<- xi[i,1]
mu[i,2]<- lam[1]*xi[i,1] + lam[25]*xi[i,2] + lam[48]*xi[i,3] + lam[70]*xi[i,4] +
lam[91]*xi[i,5] + lam[111]*xi[i,6] +c[1] # Allegatio
mu[i,3]<- lam[2]*xi[i,1] + lam[26]*xi[i,2] + lam[49]*xi[i,3] + lam[71]*xi[i,4] +
lam[92]*xi[i,5] + lam[112]*xi[i,6] +c[2] # Ballotrel
mu[i,4]<- lam[3]*xi[i,1] + lam[27]*xi[i,2] + lam[50]*xi[i,3] + lam[72]*xi[i,4] +
lam[93]*xi[i,5] + lam[113]*xi[i,6] +c[3] # Countingo
mu[i,5]<- lam[4]*xi[i,1] + lam[28]*xi[i,2] + lam[51]*xi[i,3] + lam[73]*xi[i,4] +
lam[94]*xi[i,5] + lam[114]*xi[i,6] +c[4] # Criminals
mu[i,6]<- lam[5]*xi[i,1] + lam[29]*xi[i,2] + lam[52]*xi[i,3] + lam[74]*xi[i,4] +
lam[95]*xi[i,5] + lam[115]*xi[i,6] +c[5] # Disabilit
mu[i,7]<- lam[6]*xi[i,1] + xi[i,2]
mu[i,8]<- lam[7]*xi[i,1] + lam[30]*xi[i,2] + lam[53]*xi[i,3] + lam[75]*xi[i,4] +
lam[96]*xi[i,5] + lam[116]*xi[i,6] +c[6] # IDrelated
mu[i,9]<- lam[8]*xi[i,1] + lam[31]*xi[i,2] + lam[54]*xi[i,3] + lam[76]*xi[i,4] +
lam[97]*xi[i,5] + lam[117]*xi[i,6] +c[7] # ImproperC
mu[i,10]<-lam[9]*xi[i,1] + lam[32]*xi[i,2] + lam[55]*xi[i,3] + lam[77]*xi[i,4] +
lam[98]*xi[i,5] + lam[118]*xi[i,6] +c[8] # ImproperD
mu[i,11]<-lam[10]*xi[i,1] + lam[33]*xi[i,2] + lam[56]*xi[i,3] + lam[78]*xi[i,4] +
lam[99]*xi[i,5] + lam[119]*xi[i,6] +c[9] # ImproperS
mu[i,12]<-lam[11]*xi[i,1] + lam[34]*xi[i,2] + lam[57]*xi[i,3] + lam[79]*xi[i,4] +
lam[100]*xi[i,5] + lam[120]*xi[i,6] +c[10] # PartyList
mu[i,13]<-lam[12]*xi[i,1] + lam[35]*xi[i,2] + xi[i,3]
mu[i,14]<-lam[13]*xi[i,1] + lam[36]*xi[i,2] + lam[58]*xi[i,3] + lam[80]*xi[i,4] +
lam[101]*xi[i,5] + lam[121]*xi[i,6] +c[11] # Problemwi
mu[i,15]<-lam[14]*xi[i,1] + lam[37]*xi[i,2] + lam[59]*xi[i,3] + lam[81]*xi[i,4] +
lam[102]*xi[i,5] + lam[122]*xi[i,6] +c[12] # Registrat
mu[i,16]<-lam[15]*xi[i,1] + lam[38]*xi[i,2] + lam[60]*xi[i,3] + lam[82]*xi[i,4] +
lam[103]*xi[i,5] + lam[123]*xi[i,6] +c[13] # Unspecifi
mu[i,17]<-lam[16]*xi[i,1] + lam[39]*xi[i,2] + lam[61]*xi[i,3] + xi[i,4]
mu[i,18]<-lam[17]*xi[i,1] + lam[40]*xi[i,2] + lam[62]*xi[i,3] + lam[83]*xi[i,4] +
xi[i,5] # CDUCSU
mu[i,19]<-lam[18]*xi[i,1] + lam[41]*xi[i,2] + lam[63]*xi[i,3] + lam[84]*xi[i,4] +
lam[104]*xi[i,5] + lam[124]*xi[i,6] +c[14] # FDP
mu[i,20]<-lam[19]*xi[i,1] + lam[42]*xi[i,2] + lam[64]*xi[i,3] + lam[85]*xi[i,4] +
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lam[105]*xi[i,5] + lam[125]*xi[i,6] +c[15] # GR.NE
mu[i,21]<-lam[20]*xi[i,1] + lam[43]*xi[i,2] + lam[65]*xi[i,3] + lam[86]*xi[i,4] +
lam[106]*xi[i,5] + lam[126]*xi[i,6] +c[16] # DIE.LINKE
mu[i,22]<-lam[21]*xi[i,1] + lam[44]*xi[i,2] + lam[66]*xi[i,3] + lam[87]*xi[i,4] +
lam[107]*xi[i,5] + xi[i,6] # fmt
mu[i,23]<-lam[22]*xi[i,1] + lam[45]*xi[i,2] + lam[67]*xi[i,3] + lam[88]*xi[i,4] +
lam[108]*xi[i,5] + lam[127]*xi[i,6] +c[17] # smt
mu[i,24]<-lam[23]*xi[i,1] + lam[46]*xi[i,2] + lam[68]*xi[i,3] + lam[89]*xi[i,4] +
lam[109]*xi[i,5] + lam[128]*xi[i,6] +c[18] # dwinner
mu[i,25]<-lam[24]*xi[i,1] + lam[47]*xi[i,2] + lam[69]*xi[i,3] + lam[90]*xi[i,4] +
lam[110]*xi[i,5] + lam[129]*xi[i,6] +c[19] # dsecond
mu[i,26]<-lam[130]*xi[i,1] + lam[131]*xi[i,2] + lam[132]*xi[i,3] + lam[133]*xi[i,4] +
lam[134]*xi[i,5] + lam[135]*xi[i,6] +c[20] # fi
mu[i,27]<-lam[136]*xi[i,1] + lam[137]*xi[i,2] + lam[138]*xi[i,3] + lam[139]*xi[i,4] +
lam[140]*xi[i,5] + lam[141]*xi[i,6] +c[21] # alpha
mu[i,28]<-lam[142]*xi[i,1] + lam[143]*xi[i,2] + lam[144]*xi[i,3] + lam[145]*xi[i,4] +
lam[146]*xi[i,5] + lam[147]*xi[i,6] +c[22] # theta
#structural equation model
xi[i,1:6]~dmnorm(u[1:6],phi[1:6,1:6])
}# end of i
#thresholds
for(j in 1:16){
thd[j,1]<-alpbot
thd[j,2]<-alpmid
thd[j,3]<-alptop
}
for(i in 1:6){u[i]<-gam[i]}
#priors on loadings and coefficients
var.lam[1]<-4.0*psi[1] var.lam[2]<-4.0*psi[2] var.lam[3]<-4.0*psi[3]
var.lam[4]<-4.0*psi[4] var.lam[5]<-4.0*psi[5] var.lam[6]<-4.0*psi[6]
var.lam[7]<-4.0*psi[7] var.lam[8]<-4.0*psi[8] var.lam[9]<-4.0*psi[9]
var.lam[10]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[11]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[12]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[13]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[14]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[15]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[16]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[17]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[18]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[19]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[20]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[21]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[22]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[23]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[24]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[25]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[26]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[27]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[28]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[29]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[30]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[31]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[32]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[33]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[34]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[35]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[36]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[37]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[38]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[39]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[40]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[41]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[42]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[43]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[44]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[45]<-4.0*psi[21]
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var.lam[46]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[47]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[48]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[49]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[50]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[51]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[52]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[53]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[54]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[55]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[56]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[57]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[58]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[59]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[60]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[61]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[62]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[63]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[64]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[65]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[66]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[67]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[68]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[69]<-4.0*psi[21]
var.lam[70]<-4.0*psi[10] var.lam[71]<-4.0*psi[11] var.lam[72]<-4.0*psi[12]
var.lam[73]<-4.0*psi[13] var.lam[74]<-4.0*psi[14] var.lam[75]<-4.0*psi[15]
var.lam[76]<-4.0*psi[16] var.lam[77]<-4.0*psi[17] var.lam[78]<-4.0*psi[18]
var.lam[79]<-4.0*psi[19] var.lam[80]<-4.0*psi[20] var.lam[81]<-4.0*psi[21]
for (k in 82:106){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[13]}
for (k in 107:130){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[14]}
for (k in 131:135){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[15]}
for (k in 136:141){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[16]}
for (k in 142:147){var.lam[k]<-4.0*psi[17]}
for(i in 1:147){lam[i]~dnorm(0.8,var.lam[i])}
var.b<-4.0*psi[1]
for(j in 1:6){gam[j]~dnorm(0.1,var.b)}
var.c<-4.0*psi[2]
for(j in 1:22){c[j]~dnorm(0.1,var.c)}
#priors on precisions
for(j in 1:P){
psi[j]~dgamma(10,8)
sgm[j]<-1/psi[j]
}
phi[1:6,1:6]~dwish(R[1:6,1:6], 30)
phx[1:6,1:6]<-inverse(phi[1:6,1:6])
} #end of model
6.2.2 Credible Intervals for Additional Model Parameters
*** Tables 11, 13 about here ***
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Table 1: SVM Classifier Performance
Class Precision Recall F-Measure Support
Absentee ballot related problem 0.85 0.92 0.88 12
Counting of the votes 1.00 0.70 0.82 10
Criminal status related problem 1.00 0.67 0.80 3
Electoral System 0.68 0.90 0.78 52
ID problem 0.80 0.89 0.84 9
Improper Campaign Influ-
ence/Allegations of Official Corruption
0.56 0.45 0.50 11
Improper Statistics 1.00 0.83 0.91 6
Other/No subject 0.56 0.71 0.63 7
Party List Ballot Access 0.67 0.36 0.47 11
Polling Place Problem 0.92 0.67 0.77 18
Problem with the creation of party
lists/district nominations
1.00 0.40 0.57 5
Registration related problem 0.83 0.77 0.80 13
Ave. Total 0.77 0.75 0.74 15
Table 2: Frequency of Postelection Complaint Types, Germany 2005 & 2009
2005 2009
Type Description Ia IIb Ia IIb
AbsenteeB Absentee-ballot Related Problem 29 29 16 17
Electoral Electoral System 67 68 54 54
PollingPl Polling Place Problem 24 24 15 15
Allegatio Allegations of Official Corruption 8 8 3 3
BallotRel Ballot Related Problem 6 6 3 3
Countingo Counting of the Votes 6 6 6 6
CriminalS Criminal Status Related Problem 5 5 3 3
Disabilit Disability Access Problem 2 2 2 2
IDrelated Identification Related Problem 6 6 13 13
ImproperC Improper Campaigning Influence 11 11 15 15
ImproperD Improper District Boundaries 1 1 2 2
ImproperS Improper Statistics 4 4 8 8
PartyList Party List Not on Ballot 19 20 22 23
Problemwi Problems with the Creation of Party Lists 2 2 9 9
Registrat Registration Related Problem 20 20 5 5
Unspecifi Unspecified Other 10 10 5 5
PoliceHar Police Harassment 1 1 0 0
VoterInti Voter Intimidation 1 1 0 0
Dortmund Briefwahl in Dortmund 12 12 0 0
Dresden Nachwahl in Dresden 35 36 0 0
Note: Number of districts that have each type of complaint in the hand-coded data.
a minimum number of districts with at least one complaint. b maximum number of districts
with at least one complaint.
Source: Compiled from archives of the Bundestag’s website for the Ausschuss fu¨r
Wahlpru¨fung, Immunita¨t und Gescha¨ftsordnung (see the Appendix). Types are described
in the Appendix.
Table 3: Common Latent Variable Covariance Matrix (Φ), Germany 2005
lowera


0.3656 −0.2159 −0.3264 −0.2854 −0.342 0.01923
−0.2159 0.4709 −0.6819 −0.3549 −0.4654 −0.3618
−0.3264 −0.6819 0.2111 −0.05212 −0.04705 −0.1264
−0.2854 −0.3549 −0.05212 0.06322 −0.002089 −0.05512
−0.342 −0.4654 −0.04705 −0.002089 0.06657 −0.05844
0.01923 −0.3618 −0.1264 −0.05512 −0.05844 0.06489


meanb


1.034 0.1246 −0.04387 −0.1283 −0.1701 0.1339
0.1246 1.401 −0.2065 −0.1469 −0.2026 −0.08673
−0.04387 −0.2065 0.4714 0.02215 0.04816 −0.02801
−0.1283 −0.1469 0.02215 0.1009 0.0382 −0.006862
−0.1701 −0.2026 0.04816 0.0382 0.1242 −0.008273
0.1339 −0.08673 −0.02801 −0.006862 −0.008273 0.1077


upperc


1.595 0.5239 0.1949 −0.01666 −0.03854 0.2999
0.5239 2.456 0.07471 0.02649 −0.0207 0.1523
0.1949 0.07471 0.8163 0.1167 0.1998 0.06854
−0.01666 0.02649 0.1167 0.165 0.0914 0.03089
−0.03854 −0.0207 0.1998 0.0914 0.2154 0.0383
0.2999 0.1523 0.06854 0.03089 0.0383 0.1817


Note: Φ = Υ−1. n = 299. a 95% credible interval elementwise lower bounds, b elementwise
posterior means, c 95% credible interval elementwise upper bounds.
Table 4: Common Latent Variable Covariance Matrix (Φ), Germany 2009
lowera


0.4378 −0.356 −0.3709 −0.1241 −0.3966 −0.2368
−0.356 0.2194 −0.4862 −0.1762 −0.3587 −0.2347
−0.3709 −0.4862 0.2981 −0.1853 −0.2617 −0.3611
−0.1241 −0.1762 −0.1853 0.06024 −0.007534 0.001031
−0.3966 −0.3587 −0.2617 −0.007534 0.1042 −5.856e−4
−0.2368 −0.2347 −0.3611 0.001031 −5.856e−4 0.09324


meanb


0.715 −0.1012 −0.08506 −0.02657 −0.2116 −0.06679
−0.1012 0.4609 −0.192 −0.0411 −0.0585 −0.04846
−0.08506 −0.192 0.5575 −0.0636 −0.07529 −0.1581
−0.02657 −0.0411 −0.0636 0.08986 0.03489 0.04346
−0.2116 −0.0585 −0.07529 0.03489 0.2003 0.07811
−0.06679 −0.04846 −0.1581 0.04346 0.07811 0.1838


upperc


1.045 0.1588 0.1509 0.06354 −0.08428 0.06973
0.1588 1.06 0.03202 0.0317 0.06286 0.07649
0.1509 0.03202 1.01 0.04118 0.06995 −0.03158
0.06354 0.0317 0.04118 0.1467 0.1028 0.1096
−0.08428 0.06286 0.06995 0.1028 0.4082 0.2326
0.06973 0.07649 −0.03158 0.1096 0.2326 0.3345


Note: Φ = Υ−1. n = 299. a 95% credible interval elementwise lower bounds, b elementwise
posterior means, c 95% credible interval elementwise upper bounds.
Table 5: Six-LV Model Factor Loadings, Latent Variables 1 and 2, Germany 2005
Manifest Latent Variable 1 Latent Variable 2
Variable load. lowera meanb upperc load. lowera meanb upperc
AbsenteeB λ101 1.0
d
Electoral λ102 0.4044 0.6986 0.9981 λ202 1.0
d
PollingPl λ103 1.542 2.877 5.145 λ203 −0.6614 0.1395 0.8013
Allegatio λ104 0.8335 1.476 2.152 λ204 0.3919 1.145 1.953
BallotRel λ105 0.01674 0.8887 2.009 λ205 0.03748 0.6303 1.266
Countingo λ106 0.001618 0.6058 1.26 λ206 0.3973 0.9294 1.515
CriminalS λ107 0.7967 1.46 2.265 λ207 −0.2748 0.3151 0.8733
Disabilit λ108 −0.1848 0.5202 1.18 λ208 0.4476 0.744 1.037
IDrelated λ109 0.4909 0.9613 1.441 λ209 −0.3552 0.33 0.9996
ImproperC λ110 −0.2004 0.5099 1.168 λ210 0.7748 1.472 2.3
ImproperD λ111 0.6577 1.277 1.976 λ211 0.03197 0.6333 1.265
ImproperS λ112 −0.2531 0.4875 1.311 λ212 −0.07786 0.9081 2.044
PartyList λ113 0.3802 1.092 1.846 λ213 0.6646 1.654 2.902
PoliceHar λ114 0.1467 0.784 1.431 λ214 0.3483 1.187 2.096
Problemwi λ115 −1.144 0.1448 1.36 λ215 −0.9509 0.02823 0.9549
Registrat λ116 1.61 2.559 3.941 λ216 −0.6108 0.1292 0.8474
Unspecifi λ117 −0.659 0.1652 1.103 λ217 0.3817 0.9536 1.513
VoterInti λ118 −0.336 0.4671 1.239 λ218 0.05514 0.6832 1.307
Dortmund λ119 1.217 2.139 3.334 λ219 0.4132 0.7019 0.9886
Dresden λ120 0.436 1.126 1.879 λ220 1.041 1.835 2.735
ze-SPD λ121 0.008381 0.1012 0.2273 λ221 −0.03039 0.09112 0.1942
ze-CDUCSU λ122 0.05329 0.1488 0.2495 λ222 7.185e−4 0.1263 0.2406
ze-FDP λ123 −0.04376 8.449e−4 0.04522 λ223 −0.03266 0.003869 0.04075
ze-Green λ124 −0.04361 0.001176 0.04598 λ224 −0.03353 0.00293 0.04002
ze-Left λ125 −0.04238 0.001429 0.0454 λ225 −0.03426 0.002278 0.03966
M13 λ126 −0.3168 −0.1878 −0.0616 λ226 −0.1072 0.06351 0.2123
M23 λ127 −0.08977 −0.02991 0.02317 λ227 −0.03861 0.01093 0.06037
jˆ1 λ128 −0.08178 −0.00776 0.06031 λ228 −0.06288 −0.004008 0.05523
jˆ2 λ129 −0.08512 0.009695 0.1015 λ229 −0.07033 0.001829 0.07703
fˆii λ130 −0.2921 0.3338 0.9947 λ230 −0.1477 0.4642 1.092
αˆi λ131 0.0226 0.229 0.4553 λ231 −0.05474 0.1664 0.3876
θˆi λ132 −0.1844 −0.01288 0.1563 λ232 −0.1344 0.01592 0.1661
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
d fixed parameter. Loading parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 6: Six-LV Model Factor Loadings, Latent Variables 3 and 4, Germany 2005
Manifest Latent Variable 3 Latent Variable 4
Variable load. lowera meanb upperc load. lowera meanb upperc
PollingPl λ303 1.0
d
Allegatio λ304 0.5171 1.247 2.024 λ404 −2.42 −0.1295 1.568
BallotRel λ305 0.4723 0.7775 1.088 λ405 0.1178 2.005 4.346
Countingo λ306 0.2572 1.027 1.854 λ406 −0.4266 1.323 3.321
CriminalS λ307 0.6238 1.493 2.463 λ407 −0.7963 0.9529 2.8
Disabilit λ308 −0.00121 0.6688 1.354 λ408 0.336 2.008 4.002
IDrelated λ309 0.6703 1.835 3.319 λ409 −0.726 1.087 3.096
ImproperC λ310 1.276 2.825 4.774 λ410 −1.395 0.7695 2.574
ImproperD λ311 −0.3167 0.7851 1.92 λ411 −1.463 0.4489 2.038
ImproperS λ312 −1.292 0.62 2.194 λ412 −1.58 0.4718 2.615
PartyList λ313 −0.7126 0.2651 1.195 λ413 −3.649 −0.7689 1.258
PoliceHar λ314 0.2603 1.27 2.351 λ414 −0.9938 0.7623 2.413
Problemwi λ315 0.2615 1.019 1.826 λ415 −0.7423 1.005 2.917
Registrat λ316 0.333 1.007 1.706 λ416 −2.24 0.2331 2.006
Unspecifi λ317 0.6336 0.9281 1.227 λ417 −0.5778 1.588 4.118
VoterInti λ318 0.2888 1.126 2.028 λ418 −0.2724 1.344 3.085
Dortmund λ319 −1.26 −0.3197 0.5522 λ419 −1.577 0.5669 2.331
Dresden λ320 −0.2468 0.4668 1.149 λ420 −2.073 0.005899 1.736
ze-SPD λ321 −0.1584 −0.002915 0.16 λ421 1.0
d
ze-CDUCSU λ322 −0.2026 −0.04014 0.1189 λ422 −0.2871 −0.01134 0.2798
ze-FDP λ323 −0.04358 0.004635 0.05416 λ423 −0.1309 −5.263e−4 0.1307
ze-Green λ324 −0.04409 0.004454 0.05422 λ424 −0.1433 −0.01223 0.1191
ze-Left λ325 −0.04449 0.003212 0.05253 λ425 −0.1266 0.002623 0.134
M13 λ326 −0.1466 0.07904 0.2805 λ426 −0.3942 −0.08156 0.2171
M23 λ327 −0.03267 0.03192 0.1022 λ427 −0.2096 −0.04519 0.1176
jˆ1 λ328 −0.05774 0.017 0.1006 λ428 −0.2555 −0.05274 0.1525
jˆ2 λ329 0.01042 0.1017 0.2225 λ429 −0.3472 −0.08234 0.1872
fˆii λ330 −1.846 −1.09 −0.2519 λ430 1.736 3.857 5.846
αˆi λ331 −0.7191 −0.4249 −0.1305 λ431 0.2724 1.053 1.739
θˆi λ332 −0.006307 0.1889 0.4166 λ432 −0.6457 −0.1235 0.4039
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
d fixed parameter. Loading parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 7: Six-LV Model Factor Loadings, Latent Variables 5 and 6, Germany 2005
Manifest Latent Variable 5 Latent Variable 6
Variable load. lowera meanb upperc load. lowera meanb upperc
Allegatio λ504 −1.414 0.7969 3.09 λ604 −0.8809 0.7731 2.307
BallotRel λ505 −1.555 0.8447 3.382 λ605 −0.5827 1.344 3.421
Countingo λ506 −0.9664 1.351 3.557 λ606 −2.06 0.1582 1.941
CriminalS λ507 −1.912 0.2792 2.432 λ607 −1.303 0.6334 2.275
Disabilit λ508 −0.8613 1.327 3.657 λ608 −0.1439 1.398 3.079
IDrelated λ509 −3.053 −0.5094 1.76 λ609 −1.67 0.3841 2.096
ImproperC λ510 −0.7132 1.893 4.459 λ610 −1.052 0.9306 2.715
ImproperD λ511 −0.5963 1.352 3.403 λ611 −0.6771 0.8688 2.347
ImproperS λ512 −3.957 −1.238 1.166 λ612 −1.073 0.6603 2.465
PartyList λ513 2.337 4.721 7.202 λ613 −1.258 0.881 3.164
PoliceHar λ514 −0.5226 1.567 3.811 λ614 −1.125 0.5364 1.938
Problemwi λ515 −0.782 1.522 3.969 λ615 −1.088 0.6379 2.111
Registrat λ516 0.1978 2.356 4.668 λ616 −0.5016 1.223 2.881
Unspecifi λ517 −2.271 0.6953 3.544 λ617 −2.928 −0.2634 2.023
VoterInti λ518 −0.3939 1.725 3.99 λ618 −0.9415 0.721 2.199
Dortmund λ519 −3.006 −0.6016 1.479 λ619 0.06662 1.635 3.474
Dresden λ520 −5.624 −3.151 −0.8895 λ620 −0.9668 0.7021 2.653
ze-CDUCSU λ522 1.0
d
ze-FDP λ523 −0.1298 0.004239 0.1385 λ623 −0.1097 0.01827 0.1476
ze-Green λ524 −0.1298 0.004022 0.1405 λ624 −0.1174 0.01224 0.142
ze-Left λ525 −0.13 0.003642 0.1383 λ625 −0.121 0.006687 0.1328
M13 λ526 −0.4024 −0.0907 0.2297 λ626 1.0
d
M23 λ527 −0.1885 −0.02121 0.1478 λ627 −0.006731 0.1486 0.3092
jˆ1 λ528 −0.2776 −0.05999 0.1571 λ628 −0.1066 0.09821 0.3071
jˆ2 λ529 −0.2572 0.03001 0.3223 λ629 −0.2064 0.08452 0.3642
fˆii λ530 0.567 1.975 3.564 λ630 0.5779 2.287 3.925
αˆi λ531 0.2655 0.9125 1.547 λ631 −0.6616 0.01666 0.704
θˆi λ532 −0.5451 −0.01161 0.5227 λ632 −0.3386 0.1662 0.6728
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
d fixed parameter. Loading parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 8: Six-LV Model Factor Loadings, Latent Variables 1 and 2, Germany 2009
Manifest Latent Variable 1 Latent Variable 2
Variable load. lowera meanb upperc load. lowera meanb upperc
AbsenteeB λ101 1.0
d
Electoral λ102 0.8418 1.366 1.871 λ202 1.0
d
PollingPl λ103 0.9178 1.488 2.258 λ203 −0.7344 −0.007504 1.05
Allegatio λ104 0.8051 1.608 2.485 λ204 −0.4512 0.4076 1.208
BallotRel λ105 1.433 3.322 5.903 λ205 −0.4061 0.74 2.122
Countingo λ106 0.4446 1.277 2.233 λ206 −4.047 −1.41 2.161
CriminalS λ107 0.1736 0.8585 1.593 λ207 −0.5664 0.5042 1.568
Disabilit λ108 0.4504 1.1 1.793 λ208 0.4593 0.7559 1.05
IDrelated λ109 0.434 0.9559 1.484 λ209 0.4958 0.8 1.097
ImproperC λ110 0.7163 1.27 1.794 λ210 0.4992 0.7554 1.018
ImproperD λ111 0.5321 0.9761 1.464 λ211 0.576 0.8053 1.038
ImproperS λ112 0.6438 1.292 2.0 λ212 0.5445 0.7829 1.027
PartyList λ113 1.086 1.766 2.576 λ213 −0.5006 0.489 1.679
Problemwi λ114 0.3654 1.078 1.733 λ214 0.09511 0.9762 2.062
Registrat λ115 1.323 2.319 3.56 λ215 −0.4602 0.4889 1.392
Unspecifi λ116 1.42 2.71 4.261 λ216 −0.3083 0.7208 1.721
ze-SPD λ117 −0.05333 0.09781 0.2459 λ217 0.03443 0.2139 0.3722
ze-CDUCSU λ118 0.3192 0.4563 0.6027 λ218 0.277 0.4651 0.6511
ze-FDP λ119 0.1202 0.2406 0.3743 λ219 0.158 0.3043 0.4602
ze-Green λ120 0.1482 0.2653 0.3987 λ220 0.1858 0.3302 0.4897
ze-Left λ121 0.2062 0.3259 0.4565 λ221 0.2745 0.415 0.57
M13 λ122 0.4265 0.5782 0.7355 λ222 0.6006 0.7699 0.9481
M23 λ123 0.1766 0.2973 0.4325 λ223 0.2678 0.4104 0.5662
jˆ1 λ124 0.1695 0.3276 0.4969 λ224 0.2883 0.4961 0.7047
jˆ2 λ125 0.2592 0.4314 0.6104 λ225 0.3832 0.6094 0.8463
fˆii λ126 0.2653 0.9946 1.876 λ226 −1.929 −0.6045 1.01
αˆi λ127 −0.09342 0.3593 0.7906 λ227 −0.5755 0.03064 0.6397
θˆi λ128 0.4629 0.6332 0.8105 λ228 0.6094 0.8081 1.014
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
d fixed parameter. Loading parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 9: Six-LV Model Factor Loadings, Latent Variables 3 and 4, Germany 2009
Manifest Latent Variable 3 Latent Variable 4
Variable load. lowera meanb upperc load. lowera meanb upperc
PollingPl λ303 1.0
d
Allegatio λ304 −0.09753 0.6294 1.324 λ404 −0.09609 0.8746 1.864
BallotRel λ305 −0.2694 0.534 1.361 λ405 −0.24 0.6977 1.613
Countingo λ306 −1.545 0.401 1.72 λ406 −0.00955 0.7574 1.5
CriminalS λ307 −3.214 −0.7638 1.497 λ407 0.1405 1.019 1.905
Disabilit λ308 0.4826 1.554 2.568 λ408 −0.4531 0.8681 2.375
IDrelated λ309 0.4553 0.7541 1.06 λ409 2.635 5.287 8.156
ImproperC λ310 0.5629 0.8592 1.144 λ410 0.5087 2.411 4.222
ImproperD λ311 0.5372 0.7746 1.013 λ411 0.4965 0.792 1.086
ImproperS λ312 0.6474 0.8801 1.116 λ412 0.4601 0.7534 1.04
PartyList λ313 0.4331 0.6802 0.9237 λ413 0.5652 0.8109 1.058
Problemwi λ314 −0.00584 1.228 2.237 λ414 0.5811 0.8185 1.059
Registrat λ315 −0.3566 0.5342 1.388 λ415 0.5659 0.805 1.048
Unspecifi λ316 0.2548 0.9457 1.656 λ416 −0.1697 0.7027 1.563
ze-SPD λ317 0.05089 0.2233 0.4223 λ417 1.0
d
ze-CDUCSU λ318 0.2085 0.44 0.6909 λ418 0.06478 0.3621 0.6707
ze-FDP λ319 0.149 0.3039 0.4784 λ419 0.02741 0.2314 0.455
ze-Green λ320 0.1813 0.3322 0.5036 λ420 0.03449 0.2434 0.4706
ze-Left λ321 0.2746 0.423 0.5901 λ421 0.07558 0.3041 0.5457
M13 λ322 0.6675 0.8309 1.01 λ422 0.09544 0.4381 0.787
M23 λ323 0.2746 0.4193 0.5788 λ423 0.05485 0.283 0.5175
jˆ1 λ324 0.3408 0.5194 0.7028 λ424 0.00281 0.3166 0.6236
jˆ2 λ325 0.4463 0.6334 0.8254 λ425 0.0802 0.4489 0.8054
fˆii λ326 −2.123 −0.4915 2.333 λ426 −1.943 0.5988 3.889
αˆi λ327 −0.7082 0.04048 1.135 λ427 −0.5502 0.3471 1.315
θˆi λ328 0.6208 0.8106 1.008 λ428 0.4711 0.7368 1.003
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
d fixed parameter. Loading parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 10: Six-LV Model Factor Loadings, Latent Variables 5 and 6, Germany 2009
Manifest Latent Variable 5 Latent Variable 6
Variable load. lowera meanb upperc load. lowera meanb upperc
Allegatio λ504 −0.04466 0.8096 1.645 λ604 −0.224 1.053 2.465
BallotRel λ505 0.01977 0.8608 1.732 λ605 0.07904 1.218 2.497
Countingo λ506 −0.1218 0.7773 1.629 λ606 −0.5269 0.8456 2.242
CriminalS λ507 −0.04332 0.7807 1.653 λ607 0.08225 1.322 2.928
Disabilit λ508 −0.2392 0.6324 1.453 λ608 −1.202 0.3236 1.61
IDrelated λ509 −0.3149 0.5676 1.534 λ609 −0.06706 1.364 3.228
ImproperC λ510 −0.8142 0.302 1.209 λ610 −1.215 0.2993 1.968
ImproperD λ511 0.1084 0.8555 1.606 λ611 −0.2573 0.792 1.855
ImproperS λ512 −0.6059 0.4769 1.361 λ612 −2.108 −0.6542 0.5467
PartyList λ513 −0.1466 0.8672 2.127 λ613 0.8841 2.801 4.668
Problemwi λ514 −0.6109 0.2824 1.223 λ614 −0.6878 0.8329 2.301
Registrat λ515 −0.21 0.6576 1.485 λ615 −0.1692 1.056 2.451
Unspecifi λ516 −0.1756 0.7788 1.631 λ616 −1.323 0.03473 1.184
ze-CDUCSU λ518 1.0
d
ze-FDP λ519 0.1601 0.3601 0.571 λ619 0.08785 0.2464 0.41
ze-Green λ520 0.2027 0.3981 0.6116 λ620 0.1126 0.2667 0.4297
ze-Left λ521 0.2896 0.4907 0.6987 λ621 0.1852 0.3417 0.5061
M13 λ522 0.4952 0.8099 1.122 λ622 1.0
d
M23 λ523 0.2468 0.4514 0.667 λ623 0.1932 0.3555 0.5235
jˆ1 λ524 0.08235 0.3869 0.7359 λ624 0.2073 0.4693 0.7151
jˆ2 λ525 0.2506 0.57 0.9149 λ625 0.1733 0.4808 0.769
fˆii λ526 −1.974 3.6 5.736 λ626 −4.027 −1.77 1.812
αˆi λ527 −0.2673 1.215 2.037 λ627 −1.438 −0.5921 0.7518
θˆi λ528 0.4872 0.7484 1.004 λ628 0.5304 0.7791 1.023
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
d fixed parameter. Loading parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 11: Six-LV Model Means, Germany 2005
variable mean lowera meanb upperc
latent variable 1 γ1 −1.949 −1.597 −0.9905
latent variable 2 γ2 −0.5198 −0.07572 0.3442
latent variable 3 γ3 −1.413 −0.7029 −0.1967
latent variable 4 γ4 −0.03215 0.1225 0.342
latent variable 5 γ5 −0.091 0.1495 0.3442
latent variable 6 γ6 −0.0117 0.1396 0.3241
Allegatio c4 −7.73 −5.039 −2.561
BallotRel c5 −2.712 −1.503 −0.2856
Countingo c6 −2.948 −1.649 −0.4649
CriminalS c7 −2.272 −1.075 0.2022
Disabilit c8 −3.936 −2.458 −1.212
IDrelated c9 −2.438 −0.9749 0.4922
ImproperC c10 −3.55 −1.652 0.2259
ImproperD c11 −4.117 −2.666 −1.295
ImproperS c12 −5.29 −3.026 −1.39
PartyList c13 −3.195 −1.673 −0.2086
PoliceHar c14 −7.074 −4.256 −2.141
Problemwi c15 −7.055 −4.358 −2.31
Registrat c16 −1.477 −0.3469 1.042
Unspecifi c17 −3.715 −2.16 −0.7097
VoterInti c18 −5.238 −3.378 −1.824
Dortmund c19 −3.44 −2.092 −0.9539
Dresden c20 −2.857 −1.626 −0.5399
ze-FDP c23 −0.02222 0.05226 0.1268
ze-Green c24 −0.04377 0.03102 0.1066
ze-Left c25 −0.06396 0.00975 0.08374
M23 c26 0.1087 0.1966 0.287
jˆ1 c28 4.264 4.377 4.491
jˆ2 c29 4.155 4.306 4.473
fˆii c30 −7.704 −6.76 −5.869
αˆi c31 0.3245 0.7096 1.066
θˆi c32 −0.234 0.07241 0.386
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
Mean parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 12: Six-LV Model Means, Germany 2009
variable mean lowera meanb upperc
latent variable 1 γ1 −2.481 −2.08 −1.616
latent variable 2 γ2 0.4517 1.519 2.239
latent variable 3 γ3 −0.1992 0.3975 1.166
latent variable 4 γ4 −0.6606 −0.2676 0.002976
latent variable 5 γ5 −0.24 0.09635 0.7126
latent variable 6 γ6 −0.5059 0.01921 0.5589
Allegatio c4 −7.269 −4.349 −1.805
BallotRel c5 −3.024 −0.5553 1.227
Countingo c6 −3.673 0.9101 3.074
CriminalS c7 −4.956 −2.639 −0.3185
Disabilit c8 −4.144 −2.497 −1.064
IDrelated c9 −2.771 −0.9271 0.8228
ImproperC c10 −1.23 −0.1532 0.8794
ImproperD c11 −3.216 −2.049 −1.049
ImproperS c12 −2.675 −1.446 −0.3596
PartyList c13 −1.512 0.5528 2.234
Problemwi c14 −4.151 −2.505 −1.025
Registrat c15 −4.541 −2.489 −0.5136
Unspecifi c16 −2.462 −0.7468 0.8823
ze-FDP c19 −0.1504 −0.01647 0.107
ze-Green c20 −0.184 −0.05289 0.06991
ze-Left c21 −0.2366 −0.09503 0.03465
M23 c22 −0.1561 −0.00657 0.1237
jˆ1 c24 3.838 4.069 4.257
jˆ2 c25 3.589 3.854 4.086
fˆii c26 −3.505 −2.042 0.6826
αˆi c27 1.102 1.648 2.422
θˆi c28 −0.7849 −0.3802 −0.009104
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
Mean parameters not shown with a value are fixed at zero.
Table 13: Six-LV Model Uniqueness Variances, Germany 2005
variable var. lowera meanb upperc
AbsenteeB ψ−1
1
0.2968 0.5544 0.819
Electoral ψ−1
2
0.2092 0.3094 0.4493
PollingPl ψ−1
3
2.416 5.862 11.17
Allegatio ψ−1
4
8.573 14.41 22.99
BallotRel ψ−1
5
0.4114 0.7681 1.407
Countingo ψ−1
6
0.4745 0.9108 1.698
CriminalS ψ−1
7
0.4021 0.7089 1.223
Disabilit ψ−1
8
0.4121 0.7406 1.306
IDrelated ψ−1
9
0.4141 0.7506 1.353
ImproperC ψ−1
10
0.3642 0.627 1.07
ImproperD ψ−1
11
0.551 1.018 1.814
ImproperS ψ−1
12
0.6347 1.249 2.313
PartyList ψ−1
13
0.3658 0.5799 0.9079
PoliceHar ψ−1
14
1.294 3.157 7.527
Problemwi ψ−1
15
0.9961 2.36 6.993
Registrat ψ−1
16
1.359 2.651 4.737
Unspecifi ψ−1
17
0.6195 1.094 1.906
VoterInti ψ−1
18
0.7988 1.446 2.542
Dortmund ψ−1
19
0.4351 0.7121 1.151
Dresden ψ−1
20
0.3829 0.6049 0.9472
ze-SPD ψ−1
21
0.08372 0.1008 0.1206
ze-CDUCSU ψ−1
22
0.07329 0.08881 0.1067
ze-FDP ψ−1
23
0.04442 0.05192 0.06074
ze-Green ψ−1
24
0.04463 0.05218 0.06105
ze-Left ψ−1
25
0.04428 0.05182 0.06068
M13 ψ
−1
26
0.07582 0.09163 0.1104
M23 ψ
−1
27
0.0538 0.06305 0.07387
jˆ1 ψ
−1
28
0.0754 0.08831 0.1034
jˆ2 ψ
−1
29
0.09657 0.1135 0.1332
αˆi ψ
−1
31
0.2355 0.2921 0.3559
θˆi ψ
−1
32
4.981 5.977 7.153
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
Table 14: Six-LV Model Uniqueness Variances, Germany 2009
variable var. lowera meanb upperc
AbsenteeB ψ−1
1
0.6516 1.196 1.792
Electoral ψ−1
2
0.2241 0.3714 0.8538
PollingPl ψ−1
3
0.444 0.772 1.344
Allegatio ψ−1
4
5.218 9.212 15.52
BallotRel ψ−1
5
0.4372 0.8138 1.507
Countingo ψ−1
6
0.3904 0.6812 1.178
CriminalS ψ−1
7
0.4065 0.7136 1.237
Disabilit ψ−1
8
0.4275 0.7508 1.307
IDrelated ψ−1
9
0.317 0.5095 0.814
ImproperC ψ−1
10
0.3104 0.5301 0.9192
ImproperD ψ−1
11
0.5198 0.9659 1.756
ImproperS ψ−1
12
0.4875 0.8944 1.62
PartyList ψ−1
13
0.3256 0.5481 0.9473
Problemwi ψ−1
14
0.652 1.791 4.227
Registrat ψ−1
15
2.709 7.155 13.52
Unspecifi ψ−1
16
0.7338 1.811 3.705
ze-SPD ψ−1
17
0.07453 0.09016 0.1084
ze-CDUCSU ψ−1
18
0.07123 0.08564 0.1026
ze-FDP ψ−1
19
0.05239 0.06196 0.07322
ze-Green ψ−1
20
0.05004 0.05911 0.06965
ze-Left ψ−1
21
0.05085 0.06031 0.07134
M13 ψ
−1
22
0.07149 0.0862 0.1036
M23 ψ
−1
23
0.05152 0.06064 0.07137
jˆ1 ψ
−1
24
0.07986 0.09399 0.1103
jˆ2 ψ
−1
25
0.1079 0.1276 0.1508
αˆi ψ
−1
27
0.2197 0.2679 0.3238
θˆi ψ
−1
28
7.661 9.215 11.12
Note: n = 299. a 95% credible interval lower bound, b posterior mean, c 95% credible
interval upper bound.
Figure 1: Election Complaints by Election Year
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Source: archives of the Bundestag ’s website for the Ausschuss fu¨r Wahlpru¨fung, Immunita¨t
und Gescha¨ftsordnung (see the Appendix).
Figure 2: Election Complaints by Type and Election Year
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Note: The type for each complaint is the first class assigned to the complaint by our
classification algorithm.
Figure 3: Administrative Complaints by Type and Election Year
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Note: The type for each complaint is the first class assigned to the complaint by our
classification algorithm.
Figure 4: Administrative Complaints by Type and Year, Percentages Since Reunification
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Note: The type for each complaint is the first class assigned to the complaint by our
classification algorithm. Percentages are computed separately for each election period.
Figure 5: Election Complaints by Type and Year, Percentages Since Reunification
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Note: The type for each complaint is the first class assigned to the complaint by our
classification algorithm. Percentages are computed separately for each election period.
Figure 6: Strategic Voting Measures, Germany 2005: Zweitstimmen Minus Erststimmen
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Note: ze-SPD, ze-CDUCSU, ze-FDP, ze-Green and ze-Left refer to the differences between
the proportion of Zweitstimmen and of Erststimmen received by the referent party in each
district.
Figure 7: Strategic Voting Measures, Germany 2005: Margins and Second Digit Means
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Note: fmt refers to the difference between the proportions of Erststimmen received by the
first- and third-place parties in each district (denoted M13 in Tables 5–11). smt refers to
the difference between the proportions of Erststimmen received by the second- and
third-place parties (denoted M23 in Tables 5–11). dwinner is the mean of the second
significant digits of the first-place party’s polling place vote counts in each district (denoted
jˆ1 in Tables 5–11). dwinner is the mean of the second significant digits of the first-place
party’s polling place vote counts in each district (denoted jˆ2 in Tables 5–11).
Figure 8: Strategic Voting Measures, Germany 2005
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Note: see the notes in Figures 6 and 7 for descriptions of the variables.
